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ARBITRATION OF EMPLOYMENT DISPUTES
WITHOUT UNIONS
SAMUEL ESTREICHER*
Author's Note: This Article was submitted to the Law Review in
November 1990 and thus does not reflect developments after that date.
On May 31, 1991, the Supreme Court decided Gilmer v. Interstate!
Johnson Lane Corp., 111 S. Ct. 1647 (1991). The holding of Gilmer-
that claims arising under the Age Discrimination in Employment Act,
29 U.S.C. 621 et seq., are arbitrable by virtue of the Federal Arbitra-
tion Act ("FAA"), 9 U.S.C. §§ 1 et seq.-is broadly congruent with
the position taken in Part II of the Article. I do, however, fault the
rationale employed by Justice White in his opinion for the majority,
which essentially sidesteps the question whether arbitration clauses
contained in individual employment agreements fall within the exclu-
sion in section 1 of the FAA of "contracts of employment of seamen,
railroad employees, or any other class of workers engaged in foreign or
interstate commerce." Justice White asserts that since Gilmer, a se-
curities broker, had made the arbitration promise as part of his securi-
ties registration application, the case involved "a contract with the
securities exchanges," rather than an employment contract as such. In
line with its recent FAA jurisprudence, the Court proceeds to give
scant recognition to the public policy implications of enforcing predis-
pute arbitration agreements encompassing claims under federal labor
and employment law.
This reasoning leaves much to be desired. Consider the facts: (i)
Gilmer had no formal employment agreement; (ii) he had to sign the
registration statement as a condition of employment; (iii) the arbitra-
tion clause purported to deal with disputes arising out of his employ-
ment with Interstate/Johnson Lane (Interstate); and (iv) Interstate is a
member organization of the exchanges requiring the execution of the
registration statement. Moreover, Justice White's citations do not sup-
port the proposition proferred that the lower courts "uniformly have
concluded that the exclusionary clause in § 1 of the FAA is inapplica-
ble to arbitration clauses contained in such registration statements;"
these decisions acknowledge that employment contracts were involved,
but read the exclusionary clause as limited to employees in transporta-
tion industries. See, e.g., Dickstein v. DuPont, 443 F.2d 783, 785 (1st
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bia College, 1970; M.S. (Industrial Relations) Cornell University, 1974; J.D. Columbia University,
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and the financial support of the Filomen D'Agostino and Max E. Greenberg Research Fund at the
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Cir. 1971); Malison v. Prudential-Bache Securities, Inc., 654 F. Supp.
101, 104 (W.D.N.C. 1987); Legg, Mason & Co. v. Mackall & Coe, Inc.,
351 F. Supp. 1367, 1371 n.4 (D.D.C. 1972); Tonetti v. Shirley, 219 Cal.
Rptr. 616, 173 Cal. App. 3d 1144, 1148 (1985).
Finally, as urged in the Article, the Gilmer case presented an op-
portunity to attempt to reconcile the pro-arbitration policy of the FAA
with the aims of protective labor legislation. The majority bypasses the
opportunity, and, in the process, leaves unresolved not only the reach
of the exclusionary clause but also the responsibilities of the arbitral
forum and reviewing court to ensure that the substantive policies of the
labor laws are being honored.
Our collective task in this special symposium issue is, I suppose, to
praise, not to bury, the Steelworkers Trilogy.I Yet, the Trilogy's model of
labor arbitration is inseparable from the institution of collective bargain-
ing, which is very much on the decline today. In a society in which labor
unions represent 15% of the nonagricultural work force,2 arbitration of
workplace disputes, to the extent it occurs at all, will increasingly take
place in settings without unions.
Virtually every collective bargaining agreement contains a formal
grievance system culminating in arbitration before an outside neutral.3
In the nonunion sector, by contrast, formal grievance systems are rela-
tively rare. Even where such systems have been established, disputes are
resolved either by an investigator-ombudsman employed by the firm's
human resources department 4 or a "peer review" panel consisting of em-
ployees of the same occupational class as the grievant and firm officials.5
1. See United Steelworkers v. American Mfg. Co., 363 U.S. 564 (1960); United Steelworkers v.
Warrior & Gulf Navigation Co., 363 U.S. 574 (1960); United Steelworkers v. Enterprise Wheel &
Car Corp., 363 U.S. 593 (1960).
2. The percentage of union-represented workers in the private sector has fallen from 35% in
1953 to 12% in 1989. See Bur. of Lab. Stat., U.S. Dept. of Labor, 42-2 Current Wage Developments
7 (Table 2)(Feb. 1990). The causes of the decline in union density are assessed in M. GOLDFIELD,
THE DECLINE OF ORGANIZED LABOR IN THE UNITED STATES (1987); Farber, The Recent Decline
of Unionization in the United States, 238 SCIENCE 915 (1987); Weiler, Promises to Keep: Securing
Workers' Rights to Self-Organization Under the NLRA, 96 HARV. L. REV. 1769 (1983).
3. See BUREAU OF NATIONAL AFFAIRS, BASIC PATTERNS IN UNION CONTRACTS 33 (12th
ed. 1989); Ichniowski & Lewin, Characteristics of Grievance Procedure" Evidence from Nonunion,
Union, and Double-Breasted Businesses, 40 INDUS. REL. RES. A. 415, 419 (1988) ("virtually all
union procedures in any occupational category provide for third-party arbitration"). Some agree-
ments provide for a tripartite arbitration board consisting of a representative of the union, a repre-
sentative of management, and a neutral (whether chosen by the parties, their representatives or a
listing agency). See also note 6.
4. For a description of investigator-ombudsman procedures, see A. WESTIN & A. FELIU,
RESOLVING EMPLOYMENT DISPUTES WITHOUT LITIGATION 86-104 (Citibank, N.A.), 176-89 (Na-
tional Broadcasting Company) (1988).
5. For descriptions of peer-review grievance boards, see D. EWING, JUSTICE ON THE JOB:
RESOLVING GRIEVANCES IN THE NONUNION WORKPLACE 185-203 (discussing procedures at the
Control Data Corporation), 223-40 (discussing procedures at the Federal Express Corporation)
(1989); Coombe, Peer Review: The Emerging Successful Application, 9 EMPLOYEE REL. L.J. 659
(1984); Olson, How Peer Review Works at Control Data, 62 HARV. Bus. REV. 58 (Nov.-Dec. 1984).
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Only a handful of firms provide for arbitration as the final step of the
grievance procedure.6
Should the law affirmatively promote arbitration of workplace dis-
putes without unions? How can arbitration in nonunion settings be rec-
onciled with the federal labor law's prohibition of employer-assisted
collective representation schemes? Is it appropriate to transplant to the
nonunion setting a virtually all-inclusive presumption of arbitrability and
relative immunity from judicial review akin to the Steelworkers Trilogy's
treatment of arbitration under collective bargaining? Should such a pre-
sumption extend to claims founded not on an employment contract but
derived from external public policy? What role should nonunion arbitra-
tion play in the event other states follow Montana's lead in enacting
wrongful termination legislation extending "just cause" protection to em-
ployees who are not represented by unions?7
These questions acquire a particular saliency because the Supreme
Court, in contexts generally not involving workplace disputes,8 has inter-
preted the Federal Arbitration Act of 1925 ("FAA")9 to establish "a fed-
eral policy favoring arbitration '" that appears to be even more
aggressive in channeling disputes into the arbitration process than the
Trilogy. The Court in Alexander v. Gardner-Denver Co.II and its prog-
eny appeared to draw a line between disputes arising under the labor
agreement and disputes arising under external law that confined arbitral
6. One survey reported that only 6 of 78 leading members of the National Association of
Manufacturers utilize arbitration for some categories of nonunion employees. See D. MCCABE,
CORPORATE NONUNION COMPLAINT PROCEDURES AND SYSTEMS 4, 75 (1988). Ichniowski and
Levin report that 10.5% of all business lines provide arbitration for managers, 11.3% for profes-
sional and technical employees, 13.4% for clerical employees, and 10.1% for production workers.
See Ichniowski & Levin, supra note 3, at 419 ("While grievance arbitration is still much more com-
mon for union than for nonunion employees, such arbitration is available for a small but nonneg-
ligible proportion of the nonunion work force."). For descriptions of arbitration in nonunion
settings, see Littrell, Grievance Procedure and Arbitration in a Nonunion Environment: The Northrop
Experience, 34 PROC. ANN. MEETING OF THE NAT'L ACAD. ARB. 35 (J. Stem & B. Dennis eds.
1982); D. EWING, supra note 5, at 281-97 (discussing procedures at the Northrup Corporation), 299-
308 (discussing procedures at the Polaroid Corporation), 319-22 (discussing procedures at the Trans
World Airlines); MICH. ST. UNIV., PROTECTING UNORGANIZED EMPLOYEES AGAINST UNJUST
DISCHARGE 8-20 (J. Stieber & J. Blackburn eds. 1983) (discussing procedures at the American Opti-
cal Corporation).
7. Vrongful Discharge from Employment Act of 1987, MONT. CODE ANN. §§ 9-2-901 -914;
see generally Schramm, Montana Employment Law and the 1987 Wrongful Discharge from Employ-
ment Act: A New Order Begins, 51 MONT. L. REV. 94 (1990).
8. The one exception is Perry v. Thomas, 482 U.S. 483 (1987); see infra text accompanying
notes 94-96.
9. 9 U.S.C. §§ 1-14 (1988).
10. Shearson/American Express, Inc. v. McMahon, 482 U.S. 220, 226 (1989) (quoting Moses
H. Cone Memorial Hosp. v. Mercury Construction Corp., 460 U.S. 1, 24 (1983)). See infra text
accompanying notes 100-12.
11. 415 U.S. 36 (1974). See infra text accompanying notes 75-84.
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competence and the finality of arbitral resolution to the former sphere.
However, Gardner-Denver and its progeny did not consider the role of
the FAA. The Court's FAA decisions, by contrast, would seem to re-
quire arbitration of virtually all state-law claims and many federal-law
claims, whether sounding in tort or contract or involving statutory poli-
cies. The tension between the Gardner-Denver and FAA lines of deci-
sions will be resolved this Term in Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane
Corp.12 Presumably, the Court will decide whether the FAA requires
arbitration of claims under the Age Discrimination in Employment Act
of 1967 ("ADEA") 13 and, by implication, claims under other protective
labor legislation.
This article addresses the question of the appropriate legal response
to arbitration of employment disputes in nonunion settings. Part I con-
siders the advisability of importing the aggressive pro-arbitration policies
of the Steelworkers Trilogy into the nonunion context. Part II examines
the status of nonunion arbitration under the at-will assumptions of ex-
isting law. Part III shifts the discussion to a possible future world of
wrongful termination legislation and asks whether arbitration should be
the principal adjudicative mechanism for resolving disputes under such
legislation.
If one is firmly committed to the principle of union representation
and its extension to the entire workforce, arbitration without unions is, at
the outside, a second-best solution and, at worst, a false cure stymieing
true reform.' 4 Although the extent to which the policy of our labor laws
12. 895 F.2d 195 (4th Cir. 1990), cert. granted in part, 111 S. Ct. 41 (1990).
13. 29 U.S.C. §§ 621 et seq. (1982 & Supp. 1986). Gilmer and Bird v. Shearson Lehman/
American Express, Inc., 926 F.2d 116 (2d Cir. 1991) (statutory claim for breach of fiduciary duty
under the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974), are the only circuit decisions to hold
that the FAA requires arbitration of claims arising under federal laws governing the employment
relationship. In Bird, on remand from the Supreme Court for reconsideration in light of Rodriquez
De Quijas v. Shearson/American Express, 109 S. Ct. 1917 (1989), see infra text accompanying note
101, the Second Circuit reversed an earlier ruling that rejected arbitrability. For contrary rulings,
see Alford v. Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc., 905 F.2d 104 (5th Cir. 1990) (Title VII of the Civil Rights
Act of 1964); Utley v. Goldman Sachs & Co., 883 F.2d 184 (1st Cir. 1989), cert. denied sum nom.
Goldman Sachs & Co. v. Utley, 110 S. Ct. 842 (1990) (same); Swenson v. Management Recruiters
Int'l, Inc., 872 F.2d 264 (8th Cir.), cert. denied sub nom. Management Recruiters Int'l, Inc. v. Swen-
son, 110 S. Ct. 143 (1989) (same); Nicholson v. CPC Int'l, Inc., 877 F.2d 221 (3d Cir. 1989)
(ADEA); Cooper v. Asplundh Tree Expert Co., 836 F.2d 1544 (10th Cir. 1988) (same); Johnson v.
University of Wisconsin-Milwaukee, 783 F.2d 59 (7th Cir. 1986) (same).
The import of the exclusion in section 1 of the FAA for "contracts of employment of seamen,
railroad employees, or any other class of workers engaged in foreign or interstate commerce," 9
U.S.C. § 1, is considered infra text accompanying notes 23-30; 86-89 & 111-22.
14. The contrast between the prevalence of arbitration in union-represented firms and its virtual
absence in nonunion firms has been seized upon by commentators advocating a strengthening of the
labor laws or passage of wrongful-termination legislation for all employees. There are several
strands to the claim. First, the widespread acceptance of labor arbitration in the union sector is
proof that a system of industrial justice can be successfully reconciled with management goals of
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restricts certain arrangements in the nonunion context will be taken up in
Part II, this article does not join issue with the larger debate over the
degree to which the law should promote collective representation of
workers. An assumption of this paper is that the union-representation
option is either unavailable to or not desired by the significant sectors of
the workforce.
I. MODELS OF WORKPLACE ARBITRATION
In determining the proper legal response to arbitration of employ-
ment disputes without unions, it is useful to model the different roles
arbitration might be thought to play in different institutional settings.
A. An Instrument of Industrial Self-Governance
The Supreme Court's federal common law of collective bargaining
agreements, as typified in the Steelworkers Trilogy, establishes a frame-
work of background or default rules for labor agreements containing ar-
bitration clauses that-in the absence of specific language to the contrary
in the agreement-requires resort to the arbitration process for virtually
all disputes arising during the agreement's term and sharply restricts ac-
cess to the courts except where in aid of the process. The justification for
this framework of rules is twofold. On one level, it may be argued that
these rules reflect the likely assumptions of the parties to a collective
bargaining agreement: they spell out the basic exchange of the union's
waiver of its right to strike over disputes arising under the agreement in
productivity and profitability. Second, the prevalence of arbitration clauses in collective bargaining
agreements is evidence of the underlying preferences of employees whether they work for union-
represented firms or nonunion shops. Third, employees in nonunion shops cannot effectively secure
arbitration systems either because of difficulties in securing collective goods or the unwillingness of
management to share power. Finally, this problem of unrealized preferences can be solved only by
reforming the labor laws to ensure that employees are able to make truly uncoerced decisions over
whether they wish to be represented by unions, or-as a second-best solution-by enacting mini-
mum-terms legislation that extends the just-cause principle of labor agreements and arbitration
mechanisms to all employees. For a forceful statement of this position, see P. WEILER, GOVERNING
THE WORKPLACE: THE FUTURE OF LABOR AND EMPLOYMENT LAW (1990).
The opposing view holds that the prevalence of arbitration in the union sector can be attributed
in part to legal compulsion, such as rules treating an employer's insistence on unilateral determina-
tion of grievances as inconsistent with good-faith bargaining. See, e.g., Continental Ins. Co. v.
NLRB, 495 F.2d 44 (2d Cir. 1974); Vanderbilt Prod., Inc. v. NLRB, 297 F.2d 833 (2d Cir. 1961);
White v. NLRB, 255 F.2d 564 (5th Cir. 1958). Or it may be viewed as an artifact of a legal regime
that enables unions to threaten midterm strikes as a means of extracting an arbitration mechanism;
only where an employer has agreed to an arbitration clause will it be able to obtain an injunctions
restraining strikes over arbitrable grievances. See Boys Markets, Inc. v. Retail Clerks Union, 398
U.S. 235 (1970). Professors Freed and Polsby further claim that unions insist on an arbitration
clause because they are responsive to their own bureaucratic agenda or the preferences of subgroups
of workers they represent. See Freed & Polsby, Just Cause for Termination Rules and Economic
Efficiency, 38 EMORY L.J. 1097 (1989).
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return for a system of bilateral resolution of disputes culminating in arbi-
tration by an outside neutral. The Steelworkers Trilogy thus serves to
reduce transaction costs in a manner akin to an important function of
contract law.
Not all of the Court's handiwork, however, can be fully explained in
these terms. Consider a ruling like Teamsters Local 174 v. Lucas Flour
Co.,15 which reads into every labor contract an implied promise on the
union's part to refrain from striking over disputes subject to arbitra-
tion. 16 Another example would be the Court's recent decision in United
Paperworkers v. Misco Inc.,' 7 which requires enforcement of arbitration
awards notwithstanding possible conflict with external public policy.' 8
The justification for such rulings lies in a substantive policy in favor of
labor arbitration as such, either because of its presumed contribution to
industrial peace or the central role it is thought to play in the institution
of collective bargaining that is the raison d'e'tre of the National Labor
Relations Act.
It would thus seem that the short answer to the question whether
the Steelworkers Trilogy should be imported into the nonunion context is
plainly "no." To extend the special status that arbitration enjoys under
the Trilogy-the twin features of a virtually all-embracive presumption of
arbitrability and a sharply limited role for the courts-to settings where
collective bargaining does not take place would be to divorce the Court's
doctrine from its underlying justification, its mooring in a particular in-
stitution of industrial governance premised on collective representation
of workers and joint labor-management determination of basic terms and
conditions of employment.
15. 369 U.S. 95 (1962).
16. Lucas Flour requires a labor union that initially had the bargaining power to extract an
arbitration clause without giving up its right to strike over arbitrable disputes to obtain express
language preserving that strike capability. This change in the burden of obtaining contractual lan-
guage has distributional consequences for the parties; even a union with considerable bargaining
power will have to make some economic concession in exchange for the clause. The ruling also
makes it less probable that terms of this type will be negotiated because they are unusual to begin
with and insistence on securing such language would suggest an attitude of militancy that the union
otherwise might not wish to convey. But see Schwab, Collective Bargaining and the Coase Theorem,
72 CORNELL L. REv. 245 (1987).
17. 484 U.S. 29 (1987).
18. Misco holds that a court cannot refuse to enforce a labor arbitration award by invoking an
elastic conception of public policy that is gleaned from "general considerations of supposed public
interests" rather than "ascertained by reference to the laws and legal precedents .... " 484 U.S. at
43. The decision leaves open, however, whether the only occasion for declining to enforce an award
on public-policy grounds is when the award itself violates a statute, regulation or other manifestation
of positive law or compels one of the parties to violate such a law. See id. at 45 n. 12. For a broader
view of the public-policy defense, see Meltzer, After the Labor Arbitration Award: The Public Policy
Defense, 10 INDUS. REL. L.J. 241 (1988).
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Professor Getman, in a much-cited article,' 9 has advanced the view
that the labor arbitration experience is not readily transferable to con-
texts outside of collective bargaining. On the other hand, Judge Ed-
wards, a highly-regarded arbitrator and labor law scholar before he
ascended to the bench, believes that arbitration can be useful in many
other settings, and particularly so for employment disputes in the nonun-
ion sector.20 Both positions are right, I would submit, because each an-
swers different questions.
Professor Getman's essential point is that the success of labor arbi-
tration is due to the role it plays in the collective bargaining process.
Labor arbitration is an adjudicative institution established by the parties
themselves as a means of closing agreements without spelling out all of
the details of their ongoing relationship. Broad general norms governing
compensation, seniority and the like are established in the labor agree-
ment, with the understanding that a great many subsidiary terms will
need to be hammered out in the grievance-adjustment process and, fail-
ing that, will be resolved in arbitration. The acceptability of this special
adjudicative mechanism is not simply a function of the parties' ability
jointly to select the arbiter-a feature that is common to consensual arbi-
tration. Rather, the explanation lies in the fact that arbitration allows for
a continuation of collective bargaining process during the life of the con-
tract. The parties yield authority to an outside neutral in only a limited
sense. The entire grievance-adjustment process provides an occasion for
midterm adjustment of the agreement. For those relatively few griev-
ances requiring arbitration, bargaining can continue while the hearings
are going on, and a great many disputes are settled before an award is-
sues. The norms governing the arbitrator's award are shaped by the bar-
gaining history of the parties and the web of informal practices that serve
to give flesh to the bare bones of the labor contract-what Justice Doug-
las referred to as "the common law of the shop."' 2 1 The award itself is
subject to continued modification by the parties either during the term of
the particular agreement or at contract renewal talks. Moreover, the ar-
biter herself, whether she sits in an ad hoc capacity or as a permanent
umpire, understands the importance of resolving the dispute in a manner
19. Getman, Labor Arbitration and Dispute Resolution, 88 YALE L.J. 916 (1979).
20. Edwards, Alternative Dispute Resolution: Panacea or Anathema, 99 HARV. L. REV. 668,
681 (1986); Edwards, The Rising Work Load and Perceived "Bureaucracy" of the Federal Courts: A
Causation-Based Approach to the Search for Appropriate Remedies, 68 IOWA L. REV. 871, 930-36
(1983) [hereinafter Edwards, The Rising Work Load].
21. Steelworkers v. Warrior & Gulf Co., 363 U.S. 574, 582 (1960).
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that will be considered acceptable by the parties--both of which are re-
peat players-if she is to keep busy in this field.
While I accept Professor Getman's thesis as a statement about the
purpose of the Trilogy, it does not follow that arbitration can play no
useful role in resolving employment disputes outside of the collective-
bargaining context.22 However, a similarly aggressive pro-arbitration
policy must be justified, if at all, on other grounds.
B. A Private Substitute for Court or Administrative
Agency Adjudication
Arbitration can also be viewed simply as a private substitute for a
formal adjudicative mechanism administered by an organ of government,
whether the civil courts or administrative agencies. The FAA and cog-
nate state laws reflect a widely-held view, in derogation of the common
law, that arbitration in commercial settings can serve as an efficient dis-
pute-resolution mechanism, and hence predispute arbitration clauses in
agreements between merchants should be enforceable on the same terms
as any other contract. The question here is whether such clauses in em-
ployment agreements warrant a different legal treatment.
1. The Section 1 Issue
A curious feature of the lower-court decisions considering the rela-
tionship between the FAA and protective labor laws is a failure to grap-
ple with an express exclusion in section 1 of the FAA for "contracts of
employment of seamen, railroad employees, or any other class of workers
engaged in foreign or interstate commerce."' 23 The legislative history be-
22. Professor Getman in fact does not go this far. The thrust of his essay is directed to the use
of arbitration as the adjudicative mechanism for a wrongful dismissal statute-a topic I address in
Part III of this article.
23. 9 U.S.C. § 1 (1988). Many of the state arbitration statutes, though generally modelled on
the FAA, either (i) limit the exclusion to collective-bargaining agreements, see, e.g., MAss. GEN.
LAWS ANN. ch. 251, § 1 (West 1988) ("shall not apply to collective bargaining agreements to arbi-
trate"); MICH. CoMP. LAWS ANN. § 27A.5001(3)(Callaghan West 1988) ("shall not apply to collec-
tive contracts"); (ii) expressly cover all employment agreements, see, eg., CAL. CIV. PROC. ANN.
CODE. § 1280(a) (West 1982) ("includes... agreements between employers and employees or be-
tween their respective representatives"); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 572.08 (West 1988) ("appl[ies] to
arbitration agreements between employers and employees or between their respective representatives
unless otherwise provided in the agreement"); 42 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 7302(b) (Purdon 1987)
("shall apply to a collective bargaining agreement to arbitrate controversies between employers and
employees or their respective representatives only where the arbitration pursuant to this subchapter
is consistent with any statute regulating labor and management relations"); or (iii) are silent on the
question entirely, see, e.g., N.Y. Civ. PRAc. L. & R. § 7501-7514 (McKinney 1980). Silence on the
question is also true of statutes following the Uniform Arbitration Act, 7 U.L.A. 5 (1985). See, e.g.,
ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 10, para. 101 (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1989). For state statutes appearing to contain
a somewhat more broadly worded exclusion that arguably might include individual employment
[Vol. 66:753
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hind the exclusionary clause sheds sparse light as to its intended reach. 24
The principal objective of Congress was to render commercial arbitration
agreements enforceable in the face of a common-law tradition that
treated unexecuted promises to arbitrate as revocable. The section 1 ex-
clusion was inserted into the statute apparently in response to objections
from organized labor that the FAA might be construed to displace col-
lective bargaining in favor of compulsory interest arbitration. 25
agreements, see, e.g., WIS. STAT. ANN. § 788.01 (West 1981) ("shall not apply to contracts between
employers and employes [sic], or between employers and associations of employes [sic], except as
provided in s. 111.10," the latter section dealing with "parties to a labor dispute").
24. The congressional committee reports are silent on the reasons for the exclusion. For treat-
ments of the legislative history and the background assumptions of Congress, see Ray, Court Review
of Labor Arbitration Awards under the Federal Arbitration Act, 32 VILL. L. REv. 57, 69-73 (1987);
Sturges & Murphy, Some Confusing Matters Relating to Arbitration Under the United States Arbitra-
tion Act, 17 LAW & CONTEMP. PRoBS. 580, 605-19 (1952); Burstein, The United States Arbitration
Act-A Reevaluation, 3 VILL. L. REV. 125, 129-34 (1958).
25. The original bill, introduced in 1922, did not contain the exclusion. See S. 4214, H.R.
13522, 67th Cong., 4th Sess. (1922). Andrew Furseth, president of the International Seamen's
Union, charged that the bill was a "compulsory labor" bill; the American Federation of Labor
(AFL) joined in this protest, and later reported to its members that its efforts had led to an exclusion
that "exempts labor from the provisions of the law." Proceedings of the Twenty-Sixth Annual Con-
vention of the International Seamen's Union of America 203 (1923); Proceedings of the Forty-Fifth
Annual Convention of the American Federation of Labor 52 (1925), quoted in Burstein, supra note
24, at 130. Since there was very little arbitration of "rights" disputes under collective bargaining
agreements at the time-something organized labor, in any event, generally favored-labor's opposi-
tion was aimed at what it feared might be government-imposed arbitration of "interests" disputes in
derogation of its right to strike. This was consistent with the AFL's general opposition during this
period to "compulsory arbitration, compulsory investigation of industrial disputes, industrial courts,
and similar devices which involve limitations upon the right to strike and regulation of relations
between employers and employees by law." L. LORWIN, THE AMERICAN FEDERATION OF LABOR
401-02 (1933).
In the congressional hearings, representatives of the American Bar Association (ABA), which
had been actively involved in the drafting process, urged that labor's concern was misplaced:
It was not the intention of this bill to make an industrial arbitration in any sense; and so I
suggest that ... if your honorable committee should feel that there is any danger of that,
they should add to the bill the following language, "but nothing herein contained shall
apply to seamen or any class of workers in interstate commerce and foreign commerce." It
is not intended that this shall be an act referring to labor disputes at all. It is purely an act
to give merchants the right or the privilege of sitting down and agreeing with each other as
to what their damages are, if they want to do it.
Sales and Contracts to Sell in Interstate Commerce, and Federal Commercial Arbitration: Hearings
Before A Subcomm. of the Comm. on the Judiciary on S.4213 and S.4214, 67th Cong., 4th Sess. 9
(Jan. 31, 1923) (statement of Mr. W.H.H. Piatt, chairman of the Committee on Commerce, Trade
and Commercial Arbitration of the ABA). The report of these same hearings also reproduces a
January 21, 1923 letter from Secretary of Commerce Herbert Hoover to Senator Thomas Sterling,
the chairman of the subcommittee considering the bill, which states: "If objection appears to the
inclusion of workers' contracts in the law's scheme, it might be well amended by stating 'but nothing
herein contained shall apply to contracts of employment of seamen, railroad employees, or any other
class of workers engaged in interstate or foreign commerce.'" Id. at 14.
When the bill was reintroduced in December 1923, it contained the exclusionary clause. Arbi-
tration of Interstate Commerical Disputer Joint Hearings before the Subcomms. of the Comms on the
Judiciary on S 1005 and H.R. 646, 68th Cong., 1st Sess. 2 (Jan. 9, 1924). Apparently, organized
labor was satisfied because it played no role in the subsequent hearings. See Burstein, supra note 24,
at 130.
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The early decisions considering the FAA's applicability to collective
bargaining agreements further complicate matters. Fearful that the anti-
arbitration premises of state common law would undermine labor arbi-
tration, the courts in these cases strove mightily to preserve some role for
the FAA in enforcing arbitration promises in collective bargaining agree-
ments. They did so by reading section 1 either as inapplicable to collec-
tive bargaining agreements or as limited to employees in particular
transportation industries.26 The Supreme Court's tour deforce in Textile
Workers Union v. Lincoln Mills ofAlabama,27 which recognized a federal
common law of collective bargaining contracts, removed the necessity for
such creative readings. Later decisions held that section 1 did indeed
exclude collective bargaining agreements from the FAA-a view the
Court itself appears to have embraced in its 1987 ruling in Misco. 2
It remains to be seen whether section 1 should be read as a flat ex-
clusion of all individual employment contracts. The "plain meaning" of
the clause suggests one answer. However, the collective-bargaining focus
of its legislative history and the ambiguity of its post-enactment treat-
ment in the courts counsel some hesitation in treating the question en-
tirely as a linguistic matter; so does the fact that the Supreme Court, in
its 1987 decision in Perry v. Thomas,29 held that the FAA required a
former employee of a securities firm to arbitrate his statutory wage claim
against his one-time employer. Whatever reading is adopted of the ex-
clusionary clause, I submit, it should be informed by an assessment of the
underlying policies. 30
26. The authorities are collected in Ray, supra note 24.
27. 353 U.S. 448 (1957).
28. See United Paperworkers Int'l Union v. Misco, Inc., 484 U.S. 29, 40 n.9 (1987). After
quoting the section 1 exclusion, the Court observed: "but the federal courts have often looked to the
[FAA] for guidance in labor arbitration cases .... " The clear implication is that section 1 excludes
collective bargaining agreements. Misco contains no discussion of whether the provision excludes all
employment contracts of workers "engaged in foreign or interstate commerce."
29. 482 U.S. 483 (1987). (The section 1 issue was neither briefed nor considered in this
litigation.)
30. There are, however, only two plausible readings. One is to give the exclusionary clause its
most natural reading, as a linguistic matter, and exempt all employment contracts involving employ-
ees in interstate commerce. The other is to read the clause in light of the opposition that led to its
inclusion in the FAA and exempt only collective-bargaining agreements. I agree with Professor Cox
that a limitation of the exclusion to employees in particular transportation industries which can be
said to be directly "engaged in foreign or interstate commerce" is artificial. See Cox, Grievance
Arbitration in the Federal Courts, 67 HARV. L. REV. 591, 597-98 & n.27 (1954). But see, e.g., Erving
v. Virginia Squires Basketball Club, 468 F.2d 1064, 1069 (2d Cir. 1972) (FAA inapplicable to profes-
sional basketball player's contract because player "clearly is not involved in the transportation in-
dustry"); Dickstein v. duPont, 443 F.2d 783, 785 (1st Cir. 1971) (securities broker not "engaged in
foreign or interstate commerce" within the meaning of Section 1).
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2. Employment Arbitration Between Relatively Sophisticated Parties
As a first cut at the question of the proper construction of the sec-
tion 1 exclusion, consider an employment agreement negotiated between
a firm and a mid-level executive of reasonable sophistication that pro-
vides for arbitration of all disputes arising under that agreement. 31
Plainly, there are considerable benefits in allowing parties to such an em-
ployment relationship to provide prospectively that disputes arising out
of that relationship will be resolved in arbitration rather than in the
courts or administrative agencies. First, the parties themselves are pre-
sumably in the best position to determine which dispute resolution mech-
anism will maximize their joint interests. Second, arbitration-despite
creeping formalism-continues to be a less formal adjudicative forum
than the courts. The absence of an extensive pre-hearing discovery prac-
tice, flexibility with respect to the reception of evidence, and the active
role of the arbitrator in developing the facts point to a procedure that
does not invariably require the assistance of lawyers. The transaction
costs involved in resolving disputes are sharply reduced to the extent
legal representation is not required. But even if lawyers are involved, the
relative informality of the proceeding tends to drive down the costs of
representation. Third, arbitration is likely to lead to a quicker resolution
of the dispute than would be possible in a government-supplied forum.
This, too, suggests lower transaction costs. There are additional advan-
tages in the possibility of securing a resolution of the dispute before an
employment relationship is severed; empirical studies suggest that the
efficacy of a reinstatement award is inversely related to the length of time
it takes to resolve the employment dispute. 32 Fourth, arbitration pro-
vides a means of resolving disputes in a relatively private manner that
minimizes reputational harms whether to the claimant or the firm. Fifth,
acceptability of the outcome is promoted by a process in which the par-
ties themselves have a role in selecting the decisionmaker. Finally, there
are advantages to the third-party public from the reduction in queues for
the scarce decisional resources of courts and administrative agencies.
31. The assumption here is that the disputes subject to arbitration will not raise questions of
public policy. The suitability of arbitration for such questions is considered in Part II B below.
32. The National Labor Relations Board's experience with reinstatment of discriminatees is
that "[t]he amount of time that elapses between the discharge and the offer of reinstatement is one of
the most important factors affecting an employee's willingness to accept the reinstatement remedy."
West, The Case Against Reinstatement in Wrongful Discharge, 1988 U. ILL. L. REV. 1, 30. See also
Aspin, Legal Remedies Under the NLRA: Remedies Under 8(a)(3), 23 PROC. ANN. WINTER MEET-
ING INDUS. REL. REs. A. 264, 267 (1970); Stephens & Chaney, A Study of the Reinstatement Rem-
edy under the National Labor Relations Act, 25 LAB. L.J. 31, 40 (1974); Chaney, The Reinstatement
Remedy Revisited, 32 LAB. L.J. 357, 364 (1981).
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Of course, it may not always be in the best interest of the parties to
agree to arbitration. The arbitrator's fee is paid by the parties rather
than borne by the public, as would be true of an action in the civil courts.
The very informality of the process-in particular, the lack of pre-hear-
ing discovery-may make it difficult for certain claims to be established
or effectively defended against. From an ex ante perspective, it may be
difficult for the parties to foresee whether the disputes they are likely to
face will require a more formal process. Uncertainty as to evidentiary
standards and arbitral reluctance to grant summary judgment may also
prolong litigation that otherwise might have been settled. Moreover,
asymmetries may arise where one side to the dispute is represented by
counsel and the other side is not,33 or where one side is likely to be a
repeat player in need of the future services of the arbiter and the other is
not.
The significance of this potential for asymmetry should not be over-
stated. The question should be whether arbitration leaves the parties
worse off in this regard than civil litigation. As a general matter, the
legal system does not provide legal representation for civil claimants un-
willing (or unable) to pay the costs of such representation. Arbitration
does not diminish the claimant's access to legal representation.3 4 Indeed,
it may improve access to lawyers to the extent it promises a cheaper, less
time-consuming method of resolving disputes. The repeat-player con-
cern is somewhat more troubling. It might be argued that there is a
built-in asymmetry favoring the employer, even if we assume the claim-
ant is sophisticated and will decline to select an arbitrator who previously
had been engaged by the employer. This is because the relevant repeat
player is not so much the employer as the firm's outside counsel (to the
extent arbitration is not handled in-house) who presumably represents a
33. See Block & Stieber, The Impact of Attorneys and Arbitrators on Arbitration Awards, 40
LAB. & INDUS. REL. REV. 543 (1987) (as compared to cases in which neither side is represented by
an attorney, each party has more favorable awards when it has attorney representation and the other
does not; yet, when both sides have attorney representation, the awards do not differ from those
rendered when neither side has such representation).
34. There is one sense in which arbitration may diminish access to legal representation. If the
claimant would have had access to a civil jury, but for the arbitration process, and we assume a civil
jury is more likely to rule in the claimant's favor and award a larger verdict than an arbitrator, the
claimant may find it more difficult to secure a lawyer on a contingent-fee basis. It should be noted,
however, that not all employment disputes are tried before a jury; not all juries will be inclined to
side for the claimant (particularly if the firm is a large employer in the locality); and, at least in some
cases, the lower costs of handling an arbitration may compensate for the possibly lower probability
of a large recovery. As discussed below, where the employment arbitration also includes claims
based on external law enabling the prevailing party to recover its attorney's fees, the arbitrator's
award would include such fee-shifting. See infra text accompanying note 121.
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number of employers. 35 It is not self-evident, however, why a claimants'
bar 36 would not emerge to counterbalance the influence of the manage-
ment bar. 37
This simplified model assumes relatively sophisticated parties and
arbitration of disputes that involve only an interpretation of the terms of
the agreement and hence present no implications for external public poli-
cies. Given these assumptions-which are relaxed in Part II-it seems
clear that the legal system should enforce the predispute agreement in the
employment contract as it would any other contract.
3. Should There Be a Presumption of Arbitrability?
The conclusion that such promises should be enforced does not,
however, imply a presumption of arbitrability. The parties can, of
course, negotiate very inclusive promises to arbitrate, which ordinarily
should be enforced. It would be, however, inappropriate under the FAA,
or cognate state laws, to adopt anything like the presumption of arbi-
trability advanced in the Steelworkers Trilogy. The purpose of the law
should be to enforce the mutual commitments agreed to by the parties
rather than to promote a particular dispute-resolution mechanism.
Thus, section 3 of the FAA provides that before granting a stay of litiga-
tion, the court must be satisfied that "the issue involved in such suit or
proceeding is referable to arbitration." 38 Similarly, section 4 directs the
court to order arbitration only upon "being satisfied that the making of
the agreement for arbitration ... is not in issue .... ,,39
In 1967, the Supreme Court in Prima Paint Corp. v. Flood & Conk-
35. Judge Edwards disputes the importance of arbitrator selection even in the collective-bar-
gaining context:
Most unions and employers arbitrate only occasionally and pick their arbitrators with little
or no meaningful prior study from a list of several available arbitrators supplied by the
Federal Mediation and Conciliation Service or the American Arbitration Association.
There is no evidence that either the quality or acceptability of the decisions of arbitrators
chosen in this manner differs substantially from the quality and acceptability of decisions
rendered by arbitrators chosen through a more refined selection process, and it is easy to
imagine the transplantation of this less careful but equally viable selection process to other
kinds of disputes.
Edwards, The Rising Work Load, supra note 20, at 935.
36. Consider the fact that common-law developments in the wrongful-termination area have
led to the creation of a national plaintiff's employment lawyer association which serves as an infor-
mation clearinghouse and representative of plaintiff interests in the organized bar and legislative
fora.
37. We should not anticipate the counterweight of a claimants' bar where the employee-claim-
ants are not likely to be able to afford, or otherwise obtain access to, legal representation. In such
circumstances, arbitration may be inferior to civil courts from the claimant's perspective because of
informational asymmetries favoring the repeat player.
38. 9 U.S.C. § 3 (1988).
39. 9 U.S.C. § 4 (1988).
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lin Mfg. 4o adopted the so-called "severability" doctrine in order to limit
the court's role in considering claims of fraudulent inducement or mis-
representation either in section 3 actions to stay litigation or section 4
actions to compel arbitration. As Justice Fortas put it:
Accordingly, if the claim is fraud in the inducement of the arbitration
clause itself-an issue which goes to the "making" of the agreement to
arbitrate-the federal court may proceed to adjudicate it. But the stat-
utory language does not permit the federal court to consider claims of
fraud in the inducement of the contract generally.41
This decision is problematic on a number of grounds. First, it is
difficult to square with the congressional judgment in section 2 that the
FAA does not override background contract law rules, but requires en-
forcement of arbitration promises "save up on such upon grounds as ex-
ist at law or in equity for the revocation of any contract." Prima Paint
thus gives the FAA a broader substantive reach-to the extent of over-
riding even contrary state law-than Congress apparently intended. Sec-
ond, the "severability" doctrine artificially isolates the promise to
arbitrate from the underlying agreement of which the promise is a part.
While it is certainly conceivable that a party may concede the validity of
an underlying agreement but claim fraud in the inducement of the arbi-
tration clause itself, it is rather improbable that fraud tainting the con-
tract generally did not also permeate the arbitration promise.42  In
essence, Prima Paint remits a party to an arbitral forum to decide
whether in fact the agreement authorizing the forum is legally effective.
Third, the arbitrators are not likely to be particularly impartial assessors
of their own authority to act. This difficulty is aggravated by the Court's
seeming assumption that arbitral resolution of the fraudulent-induce-
ment claim will be treated like any other claim-subject only to limited
judicial review.
40. 388 U.S. 395 (1967).
41. Id. at 403-04.
42. As Judge Debevoise has noted:
The result in Prima Paint is not wholly logical. It leaves federal courts with the rather rare
and narrow issue of whether fraud was directed specifically to the arbitration clause while
passing the more frequent and usually more complex question of whether fraud was di-
rected to the entire contract to the arbitration panel ....
Republic of the Philippines v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 714 F. Supp. 1362, 1367 (D.N.J. 1989).
The courts do recognize that "where the allegation is one of fraud in the factum, i.e., ineffective
assent to the contract, the issue is not subject to resolution pursuant to an arbitration clause con-
tained in the contract documents." Cancanon v. Smith Barney, Harris, Upham & Co., 805 F.2d 998,
1000 (1 1th Cir. 1986). However, this fraud-in-the-factum exception to Prima Paint requires allega-
tions of "misrepresentation as to the character or essential terms of a proposed contract induc[ing]
conduct that appears to be a manifestation of assent by one who neither knows nor has reasonable
opportunity to know of the character or essential terms of the proposed contract," such that "his
conduct is not effective as a manifestation of assent." Republic of the Philippines, 714 F. Supp. at
1368-69 (emphasis omitted) (quoting RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 163 (1979)).
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Most importantly, Justice Fortas can offer no policy justification for
the Court's remarkable reading. He refers to the "the unmistakably clear
congressional purpose that the arbitration procedure, when selected by
the parties to a contract, be speedy and not subject to delay and obstruc-
tion in the courts."' 43 This, of course, simply begs the question. The
Steelworkers Trilogy seeks to compel arbitration of barely colorable
claims for arbitration because of a substantive goal, thought imbedded in
the National Labor Relations Act, of promoting industrial self-govern-
ment. Here, the court's role should be confined to effectuating the inten-
tions of the parties rather than promoting a particular dispute-resolution
mechanism.
C. A Public Substitute for Court or Administrative Agency
Adjudication
Yet a third model of workplace arbitration involves a government-
imposed substitute for traditional civil courts or administrative agencies.
Under this model, although the arbitrator sits as an agent of the state,
arbitration is thought to offer certain advantages over traditional fora,
including: (i) a relatively informal, quick and low-visibility resolution of
the dispute; (ii) party participation in the selection of the arbiter; (iii) an
arbiter with some specialized understanding of employment disputes or
of the particular industry; (iv) a tailoring of the procedures and charac-
teristics of the tribunal to suit the needs of the parties; (v) a rule-setting
process relatively free of stare decisis constraints; and (vi) a potential inte-
gration of adjudication with mediation techniques.
Mandatory arbitration has been proposed as the adjudicative mech-
anism for wrongful-termination statutes. These proposals, which are ad-
dressed in Part III, pose the question whether it is appropriate to utilize a
dispute-resolution mechanism that developed in consensual settings as an
instrument of coercive state power free of the institutional safeguards and
other trappings that attend adjudication by courts and administrative
agencies.
The perspective of the Steelworkers Trilogy would seem inapposite
in this context. Pro-arbitration policies, whether of the Trilogy variety or
the FAA-inspired variety, are justified by an interest in party autonomy
or voluntarism. Notwithstanding party involvement in the selection of
the arbiter and the design of hearing procedures, mandatory arbitration
is fundamentally an alternative state forum for the resolution of disputes
subject to the usual rules governing public adjudication. Thus, for exam-
43. 388 U.S. at 104.
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pie, a presumption of arbitrability here is no different from a presump-
tion of adjudicative jurisdiction, which we ordinarily would not
recognize in the case of courts or administrative agencies. Similarly, the
limited judicial review typically accorded to arbitration awards would be
inappropriate; such awards should be reviewed at least on the same terms
as formal administrative agency adjudications.
II. ARBITRATION IN NONUNION SETTINGS UNDER EXISTING LAW
This part of the article considers the status of private, nonunion ar-
bitration under existing law. With the exception of Montana, absent an
agreement to the contrary, an employment relationship is terminable at
the will of either party. Nonunion arbitration of employment disputes is
likely to occur, if at all, under two different scenarios. In one setting,
arbitration is the final step of an internal dispute system established by
the employer to govern disputes under unilaterally promulgated policies
that need not be generally distributed to employees and are subject to
prospective modification or revocation. The FAA and cognate state laws
would appear not to apply because of the absence of "an agreement in
writing to submit to arbitration an existing controversy.. . ."44 Such
arbitrations, I argue below, would be limited to claims arising under the
employer's policies, and awards would be enforced only to the extent
consistent with state public policy. The principal issues here are whether
an arbitration promise contained in a unilateral employer policy should
be enforceable, as a matter of state contract law, with respect to claims
arising under the policy; and whether the policies of the National Labor
Relations Act erect any barrier to the use of employee representatives in
the dispute-resolution process.
In the second setting, the arbitration commitment is contained in a
written employment agreement. The terms of the agreement may be the
same for all employees in a given job category or plant subdivision or
they may be subject to modification in negotiations with individual em-
ployees. If such agreements are valid under generally applicable princi-
ples of state contract law (concerning such matters as duress, fraud,
illusory promise and unconscionability), the FAA would apply in the
absence of section 1. Because the FAA creates a very strong presump-
tion of arbitrability overriding state-law policy judgments that particular
claims should be heard in the courts and channeling even a great many
claims arising under federal law into the arbitral forum, the scope of the
exclusionary clause thus becomes highly material. After rejecting a gen-
44. 9 U.S.C. § 2 (1988).
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eralized objection to arbitral competence to consider issues of external
law, I consider two principal arguments that might be raised for reading
section 1 literally to exclude all employment contracts: (i) the objection
that employees as a class should not be bound to such agreements be-
cause of their lack of bargaining power or economic sophistication (what
I call the "unsophisticated claimant" objection); and (ii) the objection
that arbitration of employment contracts under the FAA would under-
mine state and federal protective labor legislation (what I call the "public
policy" objection).
A. Arbitration Pursuant to Unilateral Employer Policies
1. Enforceability as a Matter of Contract Law
Increasingly, unilateral employer policies are found to create en-
forceable contractual entitlements. As a matter of state contract law,
courts have dispensed with requirements of mutuality of obligation, in-
dependent consideration or detrimental reliance in order to enforce com-
mitments contained in such policies against employers. 45 Moreover,
these policies have been found to be binding on employers even where
they have not been generally distributed to employees and are expressly
subject to prospective modification or revocation. 46 When such policies
provide that claims based on their terms are subject to "final and bind-
ing" resolution by a designated dispute mechanism, should employees be
able to bypass the designated mechanism and repair to the civil courts?
Initially, the question is whether an at-will employee's act of contin-
uing to work after promulgation of such a policy containing a written
arbitration term constitutes "an agreement in writing to submit [such
claims] to arbitration," within the meaning of the FAA and state arbitra-
tion laws. Although there appears to be no authority directly on point,
the case for finding the requisite "agreement in writing" is problematic.
Admittedly, outside of the employment context, unilateral contracts con-
taining arbitration terms have been held to come within the FAA's
reach. 47 It is not at all clear, however, that the enforceability of unilat-
eral employer policy pronouncements that need not be disseminated to
employees and are subject to revocation can be grounded on unilateral
45. See the authorities collected in S. ESTREICHER & M. HARPER, CASES AND MATERIALS ON
THE LAW GOVERNING THE EMPLOYMENT RELATIONSHIP 705-20 (1990).
46. See, e.g., Woolley v. Hoffman La-Roche, Inc., 99 N.J. 284, 491 A.2d 1257, modified, 101
N.J. 10, 499 A.2d 515 (1985).
47. See, e.g., Joseph Muller Corp. Zurich v. Commonwealth Petrochem., Inc., 334 F. Supp.
1013 (S.D.N.Y. 1971) (single integrated written agreement containing arbitration term is not re-
quired by the FAA).
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contract theory as conventionally formulated. Such decisions are better
understood, I submit, not as a species of traditional contract law but as
an instance of estoppel akin to the administrative law doctrine that ad-
ministrative agencies are bound to self-imposed restrictions on their dis-
cretionary authority until they have formally rescinded those
restrictions.4
If we assume that the FAA and state arbitration statutes do not
apply, is there a legal basis for either enabling the employee to bypass the
internal dispute mechanism and assert a claim under the unilateral policy
in the civil courts or conditioning exclusive resort to that mechanism on
satisfying some set of minimum procedural safeguards? This issue, too,
has been rarely litigated to date. There are a few decisions permitting a
civil action where the dispute mechanism is lacking in certain procedural
safeguards, such as the right to conduct cross-examination and receive a
written statement of the reasons for the decision.4 9 The theoretical un-
derpinning of these decisions, though not clearly stated, appears to be a
judgment that giving adjudicative finality to the internal-dispute mecha-
nism would render the underlying contractual commitment an illusory
promise.50 But if the employer can unilaterally revoke or modify the
commitments contained in its policy manual, it seems difficult to under-
48. See generally Accardi v. Shaugnessy, 347 U.S. 260 (1954). For intimations of this approach
in the employment context, see Bankey v. Storer Broadcasting Co., 432 Mich. 438, 443 N.W.2d 112
(1989) (en banc). A more difficult point is the question of midterm modification-that is, whether an
employer can unilaterally change an existing policy to provide that claims that have matured under
the terms of the preexisting policy are henceforth subject to a designated dispute mechanism. See S.
ESTREICHER & M. HARPER, supra note 45, at 716-20 (1990).
49. Many of the decisions have arisen in Michigan where the state high-court has recognized
that while unilateral employer policies can give rise to contractual "just cause" protections, "the
employer can avoid the perils of jury assessment by providing for an alternative method of dispute
resolution. A written agreement for a definite or indefinite term to discharge only for cause could,
for example, provide for binding arbitration on the issues of cause and damages." Toussaint v. Blue
Cross & Blue Shield, 408 Mich. 579, 624, 292 N.W.2d 880, 897 (1980). While arbitration is not
invariably required, the employer's in-house adjudicative mechanism must contain certain "essential
elements necessary to fair adjudication" in order to preclude a civil action. See, e.g., Renny v. Port
Huron Hospital, 427 Mich. 415, 437-38, 398 N.W.2d 327, 338-39 (1986). In Renny, even though the
employee voluntarily agreed to submit her termination grievance before a joint employer-employee
grievance board for a final, binding determination, she was not given advance notice of the identity
of the witnesses who would testify against her or the specific allegations of misconduct; was not
permitted to be present during the testimony of other witnesses; and could not call witnesses of her
own without the board's approval. Moreover, no record or transcript of the hearing was kept and
the grievance board made no findings of fact. See generally Feliu, Legal Consequences of Nonunion
Dispute-Resolution Systems, 13 EMPLOYEE RELs. L.J. 83 (1987).
50. An analogy might be drawn here to the contract law's treatment of "satisfaction" contracts
and recognition of an implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing. I am indebted to Professor
Michael Harper of Boston University for the suggestion that proceduralist review in this context, in
effect, requires the employer to "pay" for the reputational advantages derived from the unilaterally
promulgated policies-in the form of a judicially enforced insistence that its substantive commit-
ments not be rendered illusory by requiring resort to an internal dispute mechanism lacking in mini-
mum procedural safeguards.
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stand why the employer cannot also insist that disputes under the policy
be committed to a designated procedure for final, binding resolution. In
any event, this illusory-promise difficulty should evaporate where the fi-
nal step of the internal procedure is an arbitration before an outside
neutral.51
Arbitration in this context would be confined to disputes involving
claims based on the terms of the employer's policies; there should be no
impact on external public policies. It is one thing to enforce an em-
ployer's unilateral policy according to the terms of that policy, whether
under a theory of unilateral contract or what appears to be an employ-
ment-law analogue to the doctrine of administrative estoppel. It is quite
another matter for an employer by a unilateral promulgation to require
an employee to submit to arbitration claims that the employee may have
deriving from an independent source in external law. It is thus highly
doubtful that a state court would deem an employee's continuing to work
under these terms a legally effective "acceptance" as a matter of contract
law.
It might still be contended, however, that unsophisticated employees
would face a systematic disadvantage in such proceedings because of the
asymmetries in representation and ability to monitor arbitrator perform-
ance previously alluded to. Moreover, the arbitrator's fees in such cases
are typically paid by the employer.5 2 Without denying the potential for
unfair outcomes in some situations, I question whether courts as a matter
of their common law authority may legitimately rewrite the employer's
policy to render enforceable the substantive contractual commitment
contained in the policy while declaring ineffective the accompanying dis-
pute-mechanism term.5 3 Again, my assumptions here are that the dis-
pute mechanism does not give rise to difficulties on illusory promise or
unconscionability grounds; and that no federal or state law requires dis-
regarding the designated dispute mechanism as a matter of public pol-
51. As Judge Edwards observes: "arbitration can achieve substantial benefits even when it is
limited primarily to the interpretation of rules developed solely by the employer and subject to the
employer's unilateral control." Edwards, The Rising Work Load, supra note 20, at 932.
52. See, e.g., D. EWING, supra note 5, at 291 (quoting Northrop Corporation's defense of this
practice: "[W]e bear the cost of the arbitration for the very practical reason that most of the employ-
ees who seek arbitration of their grievances simply couldn't afford it if we did not. We really find
that when we deserve to win, we usually do, and when we don't, we lose.").
53. If the employer's unilateral policy establishes a legally binding commitment, it is a commit-
ment to subject its personnel decisions to particular norms under a designated dispute-mechanism.
Unlike the public-employment context, where constitutional norms of procedural due process juris-
prudence require a bifurcation of "substance" and "process," see Cleveland Board of Educ. v.
Loudermill, 470 U.S. 532 (1985), here the "bitter" has to be taken with the "sweet." But see supra
note 50.
CHICAGO-KENT LAW REVIEW
icy. 54 Even aside from the question of authority, courts have to assess, as
a policy matter, whether paternalistic solicitude for the contractual ca-
pacity of unsophisticated employees will leave them less well off-should
the employer dilute the substantive provisions of the policy or revoke it
altogether-than enforcing the unilateral policy according to its terms.55
The "unsophisticated claimant" objection loses some of its force
where the dispute procedure contained in the employer's unilateral pol-
icy makes provision for competent representation of the employee's inter-
ests. A number of firms have sought to improve the representational
balance by appointing members of the human resources department as
"counsellors" whose function is to serve as the employee's independent
advocate, or by creating a system of independent peer representatives.
Where these features are present, the case for enforcement of the arbitra-
tion provision is considerably strengthened. 56
2. The "Company Union" Objection
To the extent we are dealing with nonsupervisory and nonmanager-
ial employees who have a federal right to form unions under the National
Labor Relations Act, an employer's provision of peer representation may
run afoul of section 8(a)(2) of the Act. 57 That provision makes it an
unfair labor practice for an employer "to dominate or interfere with the
formation or administration of any labor organization or contribute fi-
nancial or other support to it .... ,"58 The term "labor organization" is
not limited to formal organizations and extends broadly, as set forth in
54. If the FAA were applicable, a state statute precluding arbitration would be held violative of
section 2's insistence that written arbitration agreements are enforceable "save upon such grounds as
exist at law or in equity for the revocation of any contract." 9 U.S.C. § 2 (1988). See infra text
accompanying notes 90-99.
55. See generally Kronman, Paternalism and the Law of Contracts, 92 YALE L.J. 763 (1983).
56. Such arbitrations would still present repeat-player concerns, coupled with a potential for
bias where the employer pays the arbitrator's fees. The question is whether claimants are better off
with a rule requiring resort to the courts-at the risk of inducing the employer to dilute the substan-
tive restrictions of the policy or revoke the policy altogether-rather than a rule allowing employers
to condition claims under unilateral policies on resort to arbitration.
57. 29 U.S.C. § 158(aX2) (1988). This ground of objection applies only where the employer
utilizes some form of employee representation. Even so, both an individual employee's attempt to
resolve a grievance with the firm as well as group presentation of grievances are expressly protected
by the proviso to section 9(a) of the Act:
Provided, That any individual employee or a group of employees shall have the right at any
time to present grievances to their employer and to have such grievances adjusted ....
Id. at § 159(a) (emphasis original). This provision should apply both to the presentation of the
grievance and its resolution either by consensual disposition or arbitration. However, the proviso
"does not say that an employer may form or maintain an employee committee for the purpose of
'dealing with' the employer, on behalf of employees, concerning grievances." NLRB v. Cabot Car-
bon Co., 360 U.S. 203, 217 (1959).
58. 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(2) (1988).
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section 2(5),59 to:
any organization of any kind, or any agency or employee representa-
tion committee or plan, in which employees participate and which ex-
ists for the purpose, in whole or in part, of dealing with employers
concerning grievances, labor disputes, wages, rates of pay, hours of
employment, or conditions of work.
Moreover, the Supreme Court announced in its sole encounter with these
provisions in NLRB v. Cabot Carbon Co.,6° that the operative term "deal-
ing with" is not limited to formal bargaining structures and reaches com-
mittees comprised of employee representatives who meet with
management to resolve grievances and propose changes in any of the sub-
jects listed in section 2(5).
There is presently a debate of sorts between the National Labor Re-
lations Board and some of the courts of appeals over the extent to which
section 8(a)(2) embodies an "institutional autonomy" perspective that
condemns all employee-representation arrangements--on the view that
only one form of collective representation of employee interests is per-
missible (independent unions) and that tolerance of other forms will
stymie the development of independent unions.6 1 The Sixth Circuit,62 in
particular, has urged a contrary "employee free choice" perspective that
leads to somewhat greater tolerance of employee committees as a means
of promoting communication and cooperation between the firm and its
employees: "It is only when management's activities actually undermine
the integrity of the employees' freedom of choice and independence in
dealing with their employer that such activities fall within the proscrip-
tions of the Act."'63
It is not necessary to resolve this debate here to conclude that a
nonunion employer does not violate section 8(a)(2) by maintaining an
internal dispute resolution system that provides for employee representa-
tives to serve either as advocates for employee-claimants (who opt for
such representation) or as members of an internal adjudicative body.
Even on the institutional-autonomy model, the employer is not precluded
from using employees to help implement managerial functions, whether
they are engaged in the performance of work as part of "work teams" or
in the investigation and resolution of disciplinary matters as peer mem-
59. Id. at § 152(5).
60. 360 U.S. 203 (1959).
61. For a good general treatment, see Kohler, Models of Worker Participation: The Uncertain
Significance of Section 8(a)(2), 27 B.C.L. REV. 499 (1986).
62. See Airstream, Inc. v. NLRB, 877 F.2d 1291 (6th Cir. 1989); NLRB v. Streamway Div. of
the Scott and Fetzer Co., 691 F.2d 288 (6th Cir. 1982); Modem Plastics Corp. v. NLRB, 379 F.2d
201 (6th Cir. 1967).
63. Federal-Mogul Corp. v. NLRB, 394 F.2d 915, 918 (6th Cir. 1968).
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bers on an in-house adjudicative body. Such use of employees does not
involve a form of collective organization of employees in which repre-
sentatives of employees speak on behalf of the group. Conceivably, any
form of employee participation in management decisions promotes em-
ployee satisfaction and, to that extent, may dampen interest in forming
an independent union. However, the statute does not require an em-
ployer to refrain from conduct that, by promoting employee satisfaction,
discourages interest in union representation. It is only the element of
collective representation of employee interests that triggers the concern,
from the institutional-autonomy perspective, that the employer is at-
tempting to undermine the conditions for forming a truly autonomous
institution for the purpose of collective representation.
The leading Labor Board decision on this question, Sparks Nugget,
Inc.,64 draws a distinction between an employee committee that "per-
forms a purely adjudicatory function and does not interact with manage-
ment for any purpose or in any manner other than to render a final
decision on the grievance, ' 65 and one that acts "in any manner as an
advocate of employee interests." 66 This language could be read to pro-
scribe use of a coworker as an advocate of the employee-claimant in adju-
dicative proceedings before a peer-review panel or outside arbitrator.
Such a reading, in my view, is not required by the institutional-autonomy
perspective. There would certainly be a problem, from that perspective,
if the employee-advocate had the authority to "initiate[ ] grievances or
recommend[ ] for management's consideration changes in terms and con-
ditions of employment .... ,,67 It is difficult to understand, however,
why the mere use of an employee-advocate to function as an in-house
lawyer for the employee-claimant who requests such assistance poses any
real threat to the conditions for forming independent unions. It should
not matter, moreover, whether the employee-advocate is enlisted from
the same job class as the claimant or from the firm's human-resources
department, or whether the employee advocate is chosen randomly or
designated by the claimant.
From the standpoint of the institutional-autonomy perspective,
there would be a stronger basis for concern if the employee-advocate is
elected by the rank-and-file and serves for a fixed term. The problem
with that view of the section 8(a)(2) prohibition is that it appears to disal-
low certain features-here, political accountability and accumulated ex-
64. 230 N.L.R.B. 275 (1977).
65. Id. at 276.
66. Id.
67. Id. at 276.
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perience-that might serve to enhance the integrity of nonunion
arbitration. Yet, the purported benefits provided to employees depend
on a set of speculative premises-that (i) the employees might otherwise
choose to be represented by independent unions, and (ii) tolerance of this
limited form of employee representation would prevent employees from
making an uncoerced decision about whether to opt for union
representation.
B. Arbitration Pursuant to Written Employment Agreements
We turn now to the much more difficult question of the status of
nonunion arbitration pursuant to written bilateral employment agree-
ments. If the promise to arbitrate is contained in a written agreement
"evidencing a transaction involving commerce, ' 68 then the FAA and
cognate state laws would apply, but for the exclusionary clause in section
1. If all that were at stake here was whether parties to an employment
agreement had to arbitrate claims arising under the agreement, and if the
enforceability of this private forum-selection clause would depend on the
absence of a contrary state or federal public policy, then the analysis here
would follow the same lines as for arbitration clauses in unilateral em-
68. 9 U.S.C. § 2. The Court's first encounter with the requirement in section 2 of the FAA-
that the written arbitration provision be found "in any maritime transaction or a contract evidencing
a transaction involving commerce"-suggested a substantial limitation on the reach of the statute.
Id. In Bernhardt v. Polygraphic Co. of America, 350 U.S. 198 (1956), the Court considered the
arbitrability of an employment contract entered in New York contemplating performance in Ver-
mont. Although the contract contained a predispute arbitration clause providing for arbitration
under New York law pursuant to the procedures of the American Arbitration Association, the em-
ployee had brought suit for breach of contract in Vermont, which adhered to the common-law doc-
trine of revocability of executory promises to arbitrate. Justice Douglas, writing for the majority,
held that the contract did not "evidenc[e] a transaction involving commerce": "There is no showing
that [the plaintiff] while performing his duties under the employment contract was working 'in'
commerce, was producing goods for commerce, or was engaging in activity that affected commerce,
within the meaning of our decisions." Id. at 200-01 (footnote omitted). Moreover, since the federal
arbitrability standard applied only to contracts falling within section 2; and, since this was a diver-
sity case, the enforceability of the arbitration clause was governed by forum state law rather than the
FAA.
Bernhardt was very much influenced by constitutional concerns, emanating from Erie R.R. Co.
v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938), that were thought to be present if the FAA established a uniform
federal arbitration procedure applicable in diversity cases, even in the face of contrary state law. The
post-Bernhardt decisions avoid the Erie difficulty by reading the FAA to stipulate a federal arbi-
trability standard for transactions within Congress' power to regulate commerce. In its 1967 Prima
Paint ruling, the Court essentially equated section 2's "evidencing a transaction involving com-
merce" requirement with the reach of federal power over interstate commerce. However, Prima
Paint was not explicit on the point, and facts of the case involved an agreement that was "inextrica-
bly tied to... interstate transfer and to the continuing operations of an interstate manufacturing and
wholesaling business." 388 U.S. at 401. Thus, it might still be argued that the "commerce" test for
FAA purposes is narrower than the constitutional reach of federal power. FAA decisions in the
lower courts have not taken this route. The Supreme Court had an opportunity to so in Perry v.
Thomas, 482 U.S. 483 (1987), which involved a wage claim between a securities firm and a former
broker-employee; this was entirely a local employment dispute.
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ployer policies. The difficulty arises because the Supreme Court has
given the FAA a rather broad sweep.69 The FAA, according to the
Court, is not a narrowly-conceived statute simply repudiating the anti-
arbitration premises of state common law. The FAA also overrides any
contrary state policy in favor of preserving access to the courts for partic-
ular claims; and, on the federal level, acts as a kind of meta-statute en-
forcing arbitration of claims under federal statutes that do not expressly
or by implication insulate forum-choice decisions from private
bargaining.
Given this construction of the FAA's reach, the question of arbi-
trability cannot be viewed exclusively from the contractarian lens em-
ployed thus far in this essay. The question addressed below is whether
this difficulty should be resolved by (i) reading section I to exclude all
employment contracts from FAA coverage; (ii) essentially disregarding
Section 1 and extending the FAA directive to all protective labor laws
(save certain federal measures that would be incompatible with private
arbitration); or (iii) by adopting an intermediate approach that seeks to
accommodate the FAA directive with the more particularized policy
judgments embodied in particular protective labor laws.
1. Arbitration of Statutory Claims
a. The Mitsubishi Compromise
It is important to keep distinct two different versions of the case
against arbitration of statutory claims. The first, which must be taken
seriously even for agreements covered by the FAA, is the proposition
that parties to a private arbitration agreement should not be able to oust
the state from advancing its conception of public policy, whether that
conception takes the form of a generalized distrust of arbitration for a
particular category of claims or a determination that a particular en-
forcement structure for such claims would be incompatible with arbitra-
tion. The second, which I consider more problematic, is the proposition
that arbitration clauses should never be read to encompass statutory
claims either because individuals possessing such claims may not pro-
spectively waive the right to a judicial forum or because arbitration lacks
the institutional competence to address such claims.
The Supreme Court has plainly rejected the second formulation-
holding that claims arising under the federal antitrust laws, RICO and
securities laws, as well as claims arising under state franchising and wage
69. See infra text accompanying notes 90-110.
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payment laws, are subject to arbitration. If we stay for a moment with
the paradigm of economically sophisticated parties, the benefits to the
parties and to the system still obtain even though the provenance of the
claim is statutory in origin rather than based on a contractual undertak-
ing. This explains why courts enforce forum-selection clauses in agree-
ments notwithstanding the presence of statutory claims. Of course, the
usual forum-selection clause contemplates litigation in a civil court,
whereas an arbitration clause commits the litigation, in the first instance,
to a nonjudicial forum. But the legal system should not assume that the
parties will be unable to select arbitrators competent to hear statutory
claims, or that the public policy reflected in the statute will invariably be
disserved. The Enterprise Wheel prong of the Steelworkers Trilogy did
state that labor arbitrators ordinarily should not consider external law in
rendering their awards. 70 The problem in Enterprise Wheel, however,
was not one of institutional competence but, rather, one of authority:
Absent an express provision incorporating external law, the labor arbi-
trator's agency is limited to an interpretation and application of the
terms of the collective bargaining agreement.71
Yet, a private agreement to arbitrate statutory claims cannot be
viewed entirely in terms of a calculus of private gain and loss that pre-
sumably is best left to the parties themselves. It is not a private settle-
ment agreement which ordinarily entails a self-implementing resolution
of a dispute. Should a dispute arise subject to an arbitration clause, an
adjudication will be had and the winner will seek court enforcement of
the award. If the award purports to resolve a claim under external law
(and hence preclude relitigation of that claim in any other forum), there
is a public interest in the manner by which the external-law norms are
articulated and applied in the arbitral forum. Thus, I would argue, when
arbitrators sit to adjudicate a dispute governed by external law, there is a
tension between the tradition of limited judicial review of arbitration
awards and the presence of an independent public interest in ensuring
that the law is correctly and consistently being applied, and that substan-
tive policies reflected in the law are neither under-enforced nor over-
enforced.
70. See United Steelworkers of America v. Enterprise Wheel & Car Corp., 363 U.S. 593, 597-98
(1960).
71. A labor arbitrator's authority is that of a "contract reader" selected by the parties. Thus,
where the parties themselves invite reference to external law, that reference does not alter the essen-
tially contractual nature of the obligation. The arbitrator's award remains as binding and subject to
limited judicial review as conventional awards involving contractual obligations derived from the
four corners of the labor contract. See St. Antoine, Judicial Review of Labor Arbitration Awards: A
Second Look at Enterprise Wheel and its Progeny, 75 MICH. L. REV. 1137 (1977).
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The Supreme Court grappled with this tension in Mitsubishi Motors
Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc.,72 which involved, among other
things, the arbitrability of American antitrust claims in the context of a
dispute between a Japanese-Swiss joint venture and a Puerto Rican dis-
tributorship. The Mitsubishi Court drew a distinction between an appli-
cation to enforce an agreement to arbitrate and a later proceeding to
determine whether to enforce an award. For purposes of the former,
Justice Blackmun explained, the FAA requires the presumption that the
arbitrator will decide the dispute in accordance with the applicable law.
At the award-enforcement stage, "the national courts of the United
States will have the opportunity... to ensure that the legitimate interest
in the enforcement of the antitrust laws have been addressed." The
Court stopped considerably short, however, of insisting that the award
would be reviewable for factual or legal error on the same terms as an
adjudication rendered by a trial court or administrative agency: "While
the efficacy of the arbitral process requires that substantive review at the
award-enforcement stage remain minimal, it would not require intrusive
inquiry to ascertain that the tribunal took cognizance of the antitrust
claims and actually decided them."'73
This "minimal" review strives at a compromise between a policy of
voluntarism-promoting private resolution of disputes by means of arbi-
tration-and the policy of the external law. On certain assumptions-
that the parties are sophisticated, the forum selected is competent to ad-
judicate the dispute according to external law, and the policy of the ex-
ternal law is indifferent as to the nature of the adjudicative forum, the
Mitsubishi compromise is understandable. 74 In contexts where these as-
sumptions would be inappropriate, however, the balance may have to be
struck differently.
72. 473 U.S. 614 (1985).
73. Id. at 638.
74. Because Mitsubishi arose in the context of an action to compel arbitration, it should not be
assumed that decision spells out all that would be required for judicial enforcement of an award. At
the very least, the award should contain findings of fact and conclusions of law and an accessible
record of the proceedings should be available, so as to permit a court to determine whether the
arbitrator has acted in "manifest disregard of the law." The "manifest disregard" standard-a judi-
cially created addition to the statutory grounds for vacating an award set forth in the FAA-re-
quires a showing that "the arbitrator 'understood and correctly stated the law but proceeded to
ignore it.' " Siegel v. Titan Indus. Corp., 779 F.2d 891, 892-93 (2d Cir. 1986) (citations omitted).
Traditionally, the absence of a written opinion and accessible record has precluded meaningful re-
view. See Speidel, Arbitration of Statutory Rights Under the Federal Arbitration Act: The Case for
Reform, 4 OHIO ST. J. ON DIs. REs. 157, 198 (1989).
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b. The Relevance of the Alexander v. Gardner-Denver Line of Cases
In a line of cases beginning with Alexander v. Gardner-Denver Co.,75
the Supreme Court has held that the labor arbitration provisions of col-
lective bargaining agreements do not require employees having individ-
ual claims against their employer under federal law76 to submit those
claims to the labor arbitration process; that the act of submitting such
claims does not constitute a waiver of right to pursue them in the civil
courts or administrative agencies; and that the arbitral resolution, while
perhaps admissible into evidence, does not preclude relitigation of any of
the issues resolved in arbitration.
For good reason, the Court in Gardner-Denver and its progeny did
not pause to consider the FAA. On the formal level, there are at least
two reasons why the FAA did not apply at all. The first is the position,
ultimately adopted in Misco, that reads section 1 to exclude collective
bargaining agreements from the FAA's purview. The second, and more
persuasive, reason is that the claims in question involved rights based on
external law rather than on undertakings that derived from the employ-
ment relationship as such; and that these rights were entitlements belong-
ing to the individual employee and not subject to modification in
collective bargaining. An employee in a bargaining unit represented by a
union can be said to authorize the union to negotiate collective terms of
employment binding on all employees in the unit. However, the designa-
tion of a collective-bargaining representative does not create an agency
for all purposes, and does not ordinarily authorize the union to compro-
mise the extra-contractual rights of employees. It therefore follows that
the arbitration clause in the collective bargaining agreement does not
constitute a written agreement between the employee and his or her em-
ployer to submit the statutory claims in question to arbitration.
This approach parallels much of the analysis employed by Justice
Powell in Gardner-Denver to explain why unions cannot waive an indi-
vidual employee's statutory claims, but does not rely on a doctrine of
presumed nonwaivability of a judicial forum for statutory claims.77 The
75. 415 U.S. 36 (1974).
76. Gardner-Denver involved an employee's Title VII claims. The Court's subsequent decisions
involved an employee's minimum-wage claims under the Fair Labor Standards Act, see Barrentine
v. Arkansas-Best Freight System, Inc., 450 U.S. 728 (1981); first amendment claims under 42 U.S.C.
§ 1983, see McDonald v. City of W. Branch, 466 U.S. 284 (1984); and personal-injury claims under
the Federal Employers' Liability Act, see Atchison, T. & S. F. Ry. Co. v. Buell, 480 U.S. 557 (1987).
77. The Court used language suggesting that individual employees could never enter into an
agreement providing for a prospective waiver of the judicial forum available under an external law.
When viewed in context, however, the language is best understood as a limitation on the power of
unions to negotiate such waivers:
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Court went on to reject the further argument that by submitting his con-
tractual claim and the substance of his statutory claim78 to the labor arbi-
trator, the employee should be barred by his election of remedies from
pursuing the latter claim in the civil courts. Two reasons were given for
rejecting the election-of-remedies contention--both by-products of the
union's lack of authority to compromise the external-law entitlements of
individual employees. The first 79 was that the employee by submitting
his contractual claim made no knowing and voluntary waiver of his stat-
utory claim because the employee had a contractual right to invoke the
arbitral forum that was in no way conditioned on a relinquishment of his
statutory right. Moreover, Justice Powell added with a citation to J.
Case Co. v. NLRB, 0 an individual employee could not be required to
relinquish individual entitlements as the price for exercising benefits se-
cured in the collective bargain. The second reason8 ' was that because the
arbitrator's mandate was confined to the labor agreement, he lacked for-
mal authority to adjudicate the statutory claim under Enterprise Wheel.
Finally, the Court considered the contention that a deferral rule
akin to the common-law doctrine of issue preclusion should be adopted
where "(i) the claim was before the arbitrator; (ii) the collective-bargain-
ing agreement prohibited [the conduct that would be charged in the civil
action]; and (iii) the arbitrator has authority to rule on the claim and
fashion a remedy."'8 2 The reasons given for rejecting deferral appear to
depend on a view of arbitral competence to apply to external law that is
contrary to the thrust of the FAA decisions. Here, too, it is possible to
read the Court's language in light of the facts before it: a labor arbitrator
who sits primarily to adjudicate claims under the contract and resolve a
It is true, of course, that a union may waive certain statutory rights related to collective
activity, such as the right to strike. Mastro Plastics Corp. v. NLRB, 350 U.S. 270 (1956);
Boys Markets, Inc. v. Retail Clerks Union, 398 U.S. 235 (1970). These rights are conferred
on employees collectively to foster the processes of bargaining and properly may be exer-
cised or relinquished by the union as the collective-bargaining agent to obtain economic
benefits for union members. Title VII, on the other hand, stands on a plainly different
ground; it concerns not majoritarian processes, but an individual's right to equal employ-
ment opportunities. Title VII's strictures are absolute and represent a congressional com-
mand that each employee be free from discriminatory practices. Of necessity, the rights
conferred can form no part of the collective-bargaining process since waiver of these rights
would defeat the paramount congressional purpose behind Title VII. In these circum-
stances, an employee's rights under Title VII are not susceptible of prospective waiver. See
Wilko v. Swan, 346 U.S. 427 (1953).
415 U.S. at 51-52.
78. The Title VII claim as such was not submitted to the arbitrator. However, Alexander
charged that his discharge was due to racial discrimination in violation of the no-discrimination
clause of the labor contract. See Gardner-Denver, 415 U.S. at 42.
79. 415 U.S. at 52.
80. 321 U.S. 332, 338-39 (1944).
81. 415 U.S. at 52-53.
82. 415 U.S. at 55-56.
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dispute in which the participants are the employer and the union, with
no formal involvement of the individual employee. The Court properly
rejected the proposed deferral rule, for, as it would later explain in Bar-
rentine v. Arkansas-Best Freight System,83 the union controls the presen-
tation of the grievance in the arbitration and functions in the proceeding
not so much as the advocate of the grievant, but more as the representa-
tive of collective employee interests.84
Thus, notwithstanding Gardner-Denver, the question of the proper
role of arbitration agreements with respect to claims under protective
labor legislation is not resolved by invoking a generalized objection to
arbitral competence to consider external law. In my view, the Gardner-
Denver line of authority is best understood in terms of the collective bar-
gaining agent's lack of authority to compromise individual employee en-
titlements flowing from extra-contractual sources.
I now turn to the question of whether arbitration clauses in individ-
ual employment contracts that purport to encompass claims under pro-
tective labor laws should be read as a waiver of the right to a judicial
forum otherwise available under those laws. Two objections to enforcing
such clauses are considered: (i) that protective labor laws represent a
global legislative judgment that employees as a class will not be able to
vindicate their rights in the arbitral forum (the "unsophisticated claim-
ant" objection); and (ii) that the policies of particular protective laws
would be undermined by requiring resort to the arbitral forum (the "pub-
lic policy" objection).85 Again, the object of the exercise is to determine
how best to read the exclusionary clause of section 1 of the FAA and
similar state arbitration statutes.
83. 450 U.S. 728 (1981).
84. [E]ven if the employee's claim were meritorious, his union might, without breaching its
duty of fair representation, reasonably and in good faith decide not to support the claim
vigorously in arbitration .... Since a union's objective is to maximize overall compensa-
tion of its members, not to ensure that each employee receive the best compensation avail-
able .... a union balancing individual and collective interests might validly permit some
employees' statutorily granted wage and hour benefits to be sacrificed if an alternative ex-
penditure of resources would result in increased benefits for workers in the bargaining unit
as a whole.
Id. at 742 (citations omitted).
85. Professor Fiss' article raises a more general objection to channeling public-law disputes into
the private arena. Fiss, Against Settlement, 93 YALE L.J. 1073 (1984). Presumably, he would favor
public resolution of external law even where arbitration provides mutual advantages to the parties
and is fully consistent with the public policy embodied in the external law. So put, the objection
vastly overstates the benefits of public-dispute resolution. An important point here is that the judi-
cial-review function requires arbitrators adjudicating claims based on external law to issue an opin-
ion containing findings of fact and reasons for the disposition, and an accessible record of the
hearings. See infra text accompanying note 121.
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2. The "Unsophisticated Claimant" Objection
It is certainly tempting to read section 1 as embodying a categorical
judgment that workers as a class should not be bound by predispute arbi-
tration agreements, either because of their limited bargaining power or a
relative lack of sophistication hampering their ability to protect their
rights in arbitration.8 6 The temptation is all the stronger when the rights
in question are based on protective labor laws-legislation reflecting dis-
satisfaction with the outcomes of private bargaining.
There may be reasons, however, for resisting such a reading (aside
from the ambiguity of the legislative intention adverted to at the outset of
this essay). First, it is somewhat anomalous to say that workers lack
contractual capacity to waive a statutory right to a judicial forum when
in many other respects concerning considerably more important terms of
the employment contract, such as compensation, rights against discharge
and duration, workers must strike their own bargains. Although particu-
lar circumstances may call for invocation of the contract-law doctrines of
unconscionability and duress, we do not ordinarily treat workers as a
class of individuals lacking contractural capacity to fill out the terms of
the employment relationship. Second, the waiver here would be limited
to the identity of the forum and would not extend to the substantive
rights recognized in the protective legislation. It is not clear that even
unsophisticated workers lacking access to counsel are always better off
with a rule requiring resort to the civil courts rather than arbitration to
pursue their statutory claims. Third, it should not be assumed that all
employees fit the stereotype of the economically strapped, unsophistica-
ted claimant. A broad exclusion of employment contracts from the reach
of the FAA and cognate state laws would not be confined to workers
seeking to enforce minimum-wage obligations under the Fair Labor Stan-
dards Act ("FLSA").87 The exclusion would also include highly-placed
management officials suing under express contracts and the mid-level
management employees who are typical claimants under ADEA. 88
Nevertheless, the case of the unsophisticated worker with limited
86. Justice Fortas intimated such a view in dicta in Prima Paint: "we note that categories of
contracts otherwise within the Arbitration Act but in which one of the parties characteristically has
little bargaining power are expressly excluded from the reach of the Act. See § 1." 388 U.S. at 403
n.9.
87. 29 U.S.C. §§ 201-19 (1988).
88. See Schuster & Miller, An Empirical Assessment of the Age Discrimination in Employment
Act, 38 INDUS. & LAn. REL. REv. 64 (1977). Congress recently has enacted legislation permitting
ADEA claimants to enter into postdispute waiver agreements provided that a waiting-period and
other procedural safeguards are furnished. See Older Workers Benefits Protection Act of 1990, Pub.
L. No. 101-433, 104 Stat. 978 (1990) (amending ADEA, 29 U.S.C. §§ 621-34 (1988)).
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bargaining power presents a legitimate concern that private arbitration
will fail to adequately protect workers' rights and will compromise the
integrity of the public law scheme. I refer not only to the repeat-player
problem (likely to be aggravated where claimants are uncounseled) but
also to the prospect of contracts calling for arbitration before tribunals
comprised of individuals experienced in the industry who presumably
may exhibit a systemic bias in favor of employers.8 9
On the federal level, concerns of this type can be accommodated (as
we shall see) in the course of determining whether the FAA requires
arbitration of claims under a particular federal law. On the state level,
such concerns cannot be accommodated because of the Supreme Court's
aggressive reading of the preemptive force of the FAA even with respect
to comprehensive state regulatory schemes embodying a particularized
judgment that certain claims should be excepted from the pro-arbitration
premises of state law. The wrong turn was taken in a footnote in South-
land Corp. v. Keating.90 The case involved a dispute between Southland,
the owner and franchisor of 7-Eleven convenience stores, and certain of
its California franchisees who were alleging violations of the state's
Franchise Investment Law. Even though California has a statute similar
to the FAA, the Franchise Investment Law was construed by the state
supreme court to invalidate any waiver of the judicial forum with respect
to claims under that statute.91 The Supreme Court found FAA preemp-
89. In the wake of Shearson/American Express, Inc. v. McMahon, 482 U.S. 220 (1987) and
Rodriguez De Quijas v. Shearson/American Express, Inc., 490 U.S. 477 (1989), which held the
FAA applicable to claims arising under the federal securities law, public attention has been directed
to the procedures used in securities arbitration panels established by the self-regulatory organizations
(SRO) in the industry. See Wallace, Securities Arbitration After McMahon, Rodriquez, and the New
Rules Can Investors' Rights Really Be Protected?, 43 VAND. L. REv. 1199 (1990); Self-Regulating
Organizations: Order Relating to the Arbitration Process Exchange Act, Release No. 26,805 [1989
Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) Para. 84,414 (May 10, 1989) (SEC approval of revised
procedures submitted by SROs); SEC Approves MSRB Rule Proposal on Defining "Public" Arbi-
trators, 4 BNA's Alternative Dispute Resol. Rep. (BNA) 316 (Sept. 27, 1990) (redefinition of "pub-
lic" arbitrator to exclude retired industry personnel and professionals devoting more than 20% of
their time to work on behalf of industry clients in the past two years). Brokerage firms have recently
relaxed their insistence that arbitrations be confined to industry panels. See Wall Street Journal,
Mar. 5, 1991 at 1, col. 3. Admittedly, industry-wide arbitration panels are likely to emerge in only a
handful of industries other than securities. See, e.g., Home v. New England Patriots Football Club,
Inc., 489 F. Supp. 465 (D. Mass. 1980) (football league arbitration presided over by league commis-
sioner). A similar issue can arise, however, where a firm's standard-form arbitration agreement for
employees designates a special arbitration panel comprised of individuals experienced in the
industry.
90. 465 U.S. 1, 16 n.ll (1984).
91. The law provided that "[a]ny condition, stipulation or provision purporting to bind any
person acquiring any franchise to waive compliance with any provision of this law .. .is void."
Franchise Investment Law, CAL. CORP. CODE § 31512 (West 1977). The California Supreme Court
had ruled that the FAA prohibited state laws exhibiting an across-the-board hostility to arbitration,
but did not "preclude a state from protecting its franchise investors through a system of statutory
regulation including nonwaivable judicial remedies." Keating v. Superior Court, 31 Cal. 3d 584,
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tion, however, because the state policy against arbitration did not estab-
lish a ground for revocation of arbitration agreements generally
applicable to all contracts in the state-as required by section 2 of the
FAA-but "merely a ground that exists for the revocation of arbitration
provisions in contracts subject to the California Franchise Investment
Law."' 92 "If we accepted this analysis," the Court warned, "states could
wholly eviscerate congressional intent to place arbitration agreements
'upon the same footing as other contracts,'.. . simply by passing statutes
such as the Franchise Investment Law." '93
The Court's extended the Southland approach to state labor laws in
Perry v. Thomas94 (although it did not consider the reach of section 1 of
the FAA). In Perry, a former employee of a securities firm sued for com-
missions owed on a sale of securities under a California wage-payment
statute. The Supreme Court held that the FAA required enforcement of
the arbitration clause that plaintiff had signed when he initially applied
for employment, even though section 229 of the California Labor Code
expressly provided that actions for collection of wages may be main-
tained "without regard to the existence of any private agreement to arbi-
trate. ' 95 Unless the state is applying its general contract law, Justice
Marshall explained, "[w]e see nothing in the [FAA] indicating that the
broad principle of enforceability is subject to any additional limitations
under state law."'96
Southland and Perry work a significant interference with the regula-
tory authority of the states over transactions governed by state law.97
The result of these rulings is to leave a gap in the state's regulatory
scheme. Even though the state believes that a certain enforcement mech-
anism is essential to the efficacy of its substantive regulation, the FAA is
read to displace the enforcement mechanism while keeping in place the
601, 645 P.2d 1192, 1201, 183 Cal. Rptr. 360, 369 (1982), rev'd in part sub nom., Southland Corp. v.
Keating, 465 U.S. 1 (1984).
92. 465 U.S. at 16 n.l1.
93. Id. at 17 n. I1 (citation omitted). Justice Stevens, in a strong dissent, argued that the thrust
of the FAA is to bar states from adopting a general common-law rule against enforcement of arbitra-
tion agreements rather than interfere with particularized judgments such as were found in the Cali-
fornia franchise investment law: "Given the importance to the State of franchise relationships, the
relative disparity in the bargaining positions between the franchisor and the franchisee, and the
remedial purposes of the California act, I believe this declaration of State policy is entitled to re-
spect." Id. at 19-20.
94. 482 U.S. 483 (1987).
95. Id. at 486 (citing CAL. LAB. CODE § 229 (West 1971)).
96. 482 U.S. at 489-90.
97. For a recent application of Southland, see Saturn Distrib. Corp. v. Williams, 905 F.2d 719
(4th Cir.), cert. denied, 111 S. Ct. 516 (1990) (FAA preempts Virginia Motor Licensing Act, VA.
CODE ANN. § 46.1-550.5:27 (repealed 1989), to the extent it bars automobile manufacturers from
making arbitration provisions a non-negotiable term of franchise agreements with dealers).
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rest of the scheme.98 These rulings also present serious difficulties for
someone wishing to preserve some role for the enforcement of arbitration
promises in employment agreements. For claims governed by state sub-
stantive law, the section 1 issue presents an all-or-nothing choice: either
to enforce arbitration clauses in all employment contracts affecting com-
merce or (out of solicitude for unsophisticated employee-claimants) to
withhold enforcement in all employment contracts.99
3. The "Public Policy" Objection
Concerns over enforcing arbitration agreements between firms and
unsophisticated employees with limited bargaining power are, as South-
land and Perry illustrate, an aspect of the larger question of the extent to
which the pro-arbitration premises of the FAA and cognate state laws
can be accommodated with the public policy reflected in the external
law. Because the FAA enjoys no automatic preemptive force for claims
governed by federal law, however, the rules governing arbitration here
can be shaped in a manner that preserves the integrity of the federal reg-
ulatory scheme.
a. The Search for an Implied Repeal
In a series of rulings culminating in Shearson/lmerican Express,
Inc. v. McMahon,'0° and Rodriguez De Quijas v. Shearson/American Ex-
press, Inc.,101 the Supreme Court has rejected a general federal public-
policy exception to the FAA, and made clear that arbitration of statutory
claims is required even where the statute seeks to deter conduct as well as
to compensate private losses. The Court's general approach is to recog-
nize in the FAA a strong presumption of arbitrability which is rebuttable
only by a showing that the particular federal law either expressly or by
implication intends to preclude waiver of the judicial forum. In essence,
98. Congress certainly has the power to shield arbitration agreements from state regulation
with respect to transactions over which there is potential legislative authority under Article I. The
wisdom of its exercise is a different matter. Moreover, it is doubtful Congress meant to venture this
far in displacing state regulatory judgments. For criticism of Southland, see Hirshman, The Second
Arbitration Trilogy: The Federalization of Arbitration Law, 71 VA. L. REv. 1305, 1347-50 (1985);
Speidel, supra note 74, at 171-74.
99. There may be some state statutes that escape the reach of Southland and Keating because
they play a role in a federal statutory scheme that is held not subject to FAA strictures. Compare
Swenson v. Management Recruiters Int'l, Inc., 858 F.2d 1304 (8th Cir. 1988) (central role played by
state civil rights statutes in Title VII scheme indicates that Congress intended to preclude judicial
waiver of forum), with Steck v. Smith Barney, Harris Upham & Co., Inc., 661 F. Supp. 543 (D.N.J.
1987) (arbitration required for state law age claim but not ADEA claim).
100. 482 U.S. 220 (1987).
101. 490 U.S. 477 (1989) (overruling Wilko v. Swan, 346 U.S. 427 (1953)).
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the FAA applies in the absence of evidence of an express or implied
repeal.
With respect to the case pending in the Supreme Court, Gilmer v.
Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., a straightforward application of the ap-
proach taken in McMahon and Rodriguez suggests that-but for section
1-the FAA will be held to require arbitration of claims under the
ADEA and, by implication, other federal employment laws. The lower
courts in conflict with the Fourth Circuit in Gilmer have sought to distin-
guish the federal labor laws from the federal securities, civil RICO and
antitrust laws 102 which the Supreme Court found arbitrable in prior deci-
sions. Each of these contentions enjoys some force, but none is likely to
support a finding of implied repeal consistent with the Court's prior
handiwork. First, arguments based on the status characteristics of the
statutory claimants go only so far. It is possible to argue that workers
asserting minimum-wage claims under the FLSA are particularly in need
of paternalistic intervention.103 But can it be said categorically that em-
ployees as a class are more in need of protection from their waivers of the
judicial forum than the customers of brokerage firms in McMahon and
Rodriguez?
Second, an argument might be made that the nature of certain statu-
tory claims supports nonwaivability of a judicial forum. It might be
thought that claims of status discrimination, in particular, implicate
moral principles that generally should not be subject to compromise.
Such a position, however, would also preclude private postdispute settle-
ment agreements (including postdispute arbitration); presumably, the
benefits to the parties and the elimination of public costs of the avoided
public adjudication support enforcement of such agreements. The objec-
tion thus must be directed to the fact that the waiver of the judicial fo-
rum occurs prior to the occurrence of the dispute, and that the nature of
the right to protection from status discrimination precludes a potential
claimant from putting a proper value on the availability of a judicial fo-
rum at that time. Considerations of this sort suggest a basis for barring a
prospective waiver of substantive protections. It is less clear that they
102. Although the Court in Mitsubishi left open the continued viability of the antitrust-law ex-
ception to the FAA recognized in American Safety Equip. Corp. v. J.P. Maguire & Co., 391 F.2d
821 (2d Cir. 1968), for agreements to arbitrate claims arising from domestic transactions, see Mit-
subishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 473 U.S. 614, 628-29 (1985) its subsequent
discussion in McMahon undercuts the "private attorney general" underpinnings of American Safety.
See McMahon, 482 U.S. at 238-42.
103. See Runyan v. National Cash Register Corp., 787 F.2d 1039, 1041-43 (6th Cir. 1986) (en
banc) (explaining in these terms why postdispute waivers of FLSA claims are barred by D.A.
Schulte, Inc. v. Gangi, 328 U.S. 108 (1946); Brooklyn Savings Bank v. O'Neil, 324 U.S. 697 (1945)).
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support a rule barring forum-choice agreements that do not involve a
such a waiver. From the standpoint of the Court's implied-repeal ap-
proach, moreover, it would have to be shown that Congress intended to
include access to a judicial forum within the set of nonwaivable
entitlements.
Third, it might be argued that the role of the federal regulatory
agency in statutes like ADEA, Title VII, the Equal Pay Act, and FLSA
is more dependent on the filing of private claims for information about
possible systemic violations than is the SEC, and hence arbitration poses
a greater potential for thwarting the agency's mission. This argument is
difficult to square with the rule, recognized in Gardner-Denver itself, that
Title VII claimants can enter into "knowing and voluntary" postdispute
settlements of their claims even without agency oversight; Congress this
year essentially reaffirmed this rule with respect to ADEA settlement
agreements.' °4 Moreover, as suggested below, it is possible to enforce
predispute arbitration agreements while ensuring that private claims of
alleged violations come to the agency's attention.
Fourth, a variant of the above argument is that private suits are
more central to the enforcement of the federal civil rights laws and the
FLSA than they are in the securities area, and, therefore, arbitration
reduces the role of the claimant to that of a private suitor in a private
forum rather than a "private attorney general" enforcing public norms in
a public manner. The Court also faced private-enforcement schemes
when it held arbitrable the civil RICO claims in McMahon and the anti-
trust claims in Mitsubishi. 0 5 This argument, too, cannot be easily recon-
ciled with the allowance of private postdispute settlement agreements.
Moreover, the fact that the statute is enforced largely through private
litigation tends to support arbitrability, for there is less risk of conflict
with agency objectives.
Fifth, the considerable regulatory powers of the SEC in the securi-
ties context, in contrast with the more limited authority of the Equal
Employment Opportunity Commission ("EEOC"), might argue for
104. The Older Workers Benefit Protection Act of 1990, see supra note 88, provides that "[a]n
individual may not waive any right or claim under [ADEA] unless the waiver is knowing and volun-
tary" in accordance with the minimum safeguards set forth therein. Pub. L. No. 101-433, § 201,
104 Stat. at 983 (amending 29 U.S.C. § 626()(1). Conceivably, this language could be read to reach
a predispute waiver of the procedural right to a judicial forum, although there is no indication in the
text of the 1990 measure or the committee reports that Congress intended to regulate arbitration
agreements or to displace the FAA. In McMahon, the Court read the no-waiver provision in § 29(a)
of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. § 78cc(a) (1988) (declaring void "[a]ny condition,
stipulation, or provision binding any person to waive compliance with any provision of [the Act]") as
limited to waivers of substantive obligations under the Exchange Act. See 482 U.S. at 240-42.
105. See discussion in McMahon, 482 U.S. at 240-42.
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greater allowance of private arbitration on the view that the SEC can
effectively police industry arrangements, whereas the EEOC presumably
cannot. This point, too, has force-as evidenced by the SEC's actions in
prodding the industry's self-regulatory organizations to improve arbitra-
tion procedures.1°6 Again, it is not entirely clear why the EEOC or the
Labor Department could not by regulation set forth the conditions under
which they would treat an arbitration award as preclusive of an agency's
enforcement effort.
Sixth, another approach is to focus on the broad equitable remedial
powers of courts hearing claims under ADEA and the other federal civil
rights laws and the central role played by private class actions as evidenc-
ing a congressional purpose to authorize litigation capable of transform-
ing values and preferences in the workplace.10 7 On the other hand, while
arbitrators have traditionally not exercised broad powers, certainly in the
labor arbitration context they have issued awards requiring employers to
make prospective changes in their operations and to avoid recurring vio-
lations.10 8 Class actions are uncommon in arbitration, but they do some-
times occur.' °9 The transformative dimension of ADEA and Title VII
litigation also can be overstated; most claims under these statutes consti-
tute fact-specific allegations of discriminatory motive in termination and
promotion decisions.
Finally, an argument available only for claims under ADEA, the
Equal Pay Act and FLSA is to infer from the congressional provision of
a right to a jury trial a preference to have claims adjudicated in tribunals
106. See supra note 89.
107. See Shell, ERISA and Other Federal Employment Statute. When is Commercial Arbitration
an "Adequate Substitute"for the Courts?, 68 TEX. L. REv. 509, 568 (1990) ("Title VII is not only a
remedial statute; it is an attempt to address a systemic social ill-discrimination-that is deeply
embedded in the cultural fabric .... Commercial arbitration is not well situated to serve this
institutional goal because it is essentially transactional in focus.").
108. The prospective-relief issue is not without difficulty in the labor-arbitration context, but
such awards have been rendered. See, e.g., Oil, Chemical & Atomic Workers Int'l Union, Local 4-
16000 v. Ethyl Corp., 644 F.2d 1044, 1052 (5th Cir. 1981); 0. FAIRWEATHER, PRACTICE AND
PROCEDURE IN LABOR ARBITRATION 637-40 (2d ed. 1983).
109. The California courts have held that certification of class claims in arbitration is proper in
appropriate circumstances. See, e.g., Keating v. Superior Court, 31 Cal. 3d 584, 613-14, 645 P.2d
1192, 1214-18, 183 Cal. Rptr. 360, 377-78 (1982), rev'd in part on other grounds sub nom. Southland
Corp. v. Keating, 465 U.S. 1 (1984). Relying on FED. R. Civ. P. 81(aX3), which provides that in
arbitration proceedings the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure "apply only to the extent that matters
of procedure are not [statutorily] provided for," a district court has granted a motion to certify a
plaintiff class in arbitration proceedings involving customer-brokerage disputes over commodity op-
tions trading. See Champ v. Siegel Trading Co., Inc., No. 89 C 7148 (N.D. Ill. June 15, 1990). The
related issue of the authority of federal and state courts to consolidate proceedings for arbitration is
surveyed in Stipanowich, Arbitration and the Multiparty Dispute: The Search for Workable Solutions,
72 IOWA L. REv. 473, 490 n.82 (1987).
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considered particularly receptive to employee-claimants.' 10 But a jury
trial would also have been available for the claims in Mitsubishi, MacMa-
hon and Rodriguez. Moreover, Title VII, under present law, does not
expressly provide for a jury trial, which raises the further difficulty that
claims under Title VII may be arbitrable while claims under ADEA
would not, despite the common substantive purpose and somewhat simi-
lar procedures of the two statutes.
b. A Process of Accommodation
Ultimately, the Court's search for an express or implied repeal of
the FAA is likely to result in the drawing of arbitrary distinctions among
federal statutes: furthering the policy of arbitration in some cases, while
promoting the availability of a judicial forum in other cases. The nub of
the problem is that all of the federal laws in question were enacted at a
time when the FAA was thought not to reach federal statutory claims. I1
In the absence of an express repeal, only a statute providing for exclusive
agency enforcement, such as the National Labor Relations Act, can be
said to be fundamentally inconsistent with private arbitration."12 The
other federal labor laws rely, however, on a mixture of agency enforce-
ment and private litigation. It is this hybrid of public and private en-
forcement mechanisms that renders intractable the implied-repeal
approach of the Court's FAA rulings.
An alternative approach would be to abandon the search for an ex-
press or implied repeal and attempt to integrate the directives of the
FAA with the policies of the federal labor law in a manner which pre-
serves the vitality of both statutes. 1 3 This process of accommodation
110. It cannot always be said that statutory provision of a right to a jury trial reflects that sort of
preference, because the availability of a jury trial often turns on historic treatment of analogous
claims for relief. In the ADEA context, the Court found a right to a jury trial because the statute
incorporated sections of the FLSA providing for a jury-tried action for unpaid wages. See Lorillard
v. Pons, 434 U.S. 575, 580-82 (1978). Congress in 1978 amended § 7(c) of ADEA, 29 U.S.C.
§ 626(c)(2), to expressly provide for a right to a jury trial in private suits "regardless of whether
equitable relief is sought by any party in such action." Paradoxically, because of the FLSA analogy,
EEOC suits may be viewed as bench-tried actions to redress a public offense even where unpaid
wages are sought in addition to equitable relief. See Lorillard, 434 U.S. at 580 n.7.
111. The then-prevailing view was set in Wilko v. Swan, 346 U.S. 427 (1953) (overruled by Rod-
riguez De. Quijas v. Shearson/America Express, Inc., 490 U.S. 477 (1989)).
112. The National Labor Relations Board has chosen, in its discretion, to refer disputes stating
claims under the statute and the collective bargaining agreement to the labor-arbitration mechanism
established by the parties. See United Technologies Corp., 268 N.L.R.B. 557 (1984); Collyer Insu-
lated Wire, 192 N.L.R.B. 837 (1971). The Board's aggressive pro-arbitration deferral policy is criti-
cized in the panel decision in Hammontree v. NLRB, 894 F.2d 438 (D.C. Cir. 1990), vac. on reh'g,
925 F.2d 1486 (1991) (en banc).
113. The Court's reluctance to integrate the policies of modern civil rights legislation with its
revival of the open-ended civil rights legislation of the Reconstruction era, see Johnson v. Railway
Express Agency, Inc., 421 U.S. 454 (1975), led to the unfortunate ruling in Patterson v. McLean
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would require that certain steps be taken to ensure that private arbitra-
tion is conducted in a manner which preserves the administrative
agency's role and the court's review function under the federal statute.
Initially, where the statute requires that a charge be filed with the
EEOC as a prerequisite to filing a civil action-as is the case under Title
VII and ADEA-arbitration of the statutory claim should be stayed un-
til after the charge has been filed and the administrative process has been
completed. 114 For Title VII claims, the process is not completed until
the EEOC has issued a notice of right-to-sue letter; 1 5 for ADEA claims,
there is only a 60-day waiting period. 116 Such an administrative-exhaus-
tion requirement provides a means of informing the EEOC of potential
violations at a particular firm and enables the agency in appropriate cases
to file an enforcement action preempting a private suit. 1 17 In deciding
whether to pursue an active investigation of the charge and, ultimately,
whether to bring an enforcement action, the EEOC could consider the
nature of the arbitration forum (including the quality of the hearing pro-
cedures) provided in the employment contract. The agency could also
issue regulations setting forth minimum procedural safeguards for arbi-
tration of Title VII or ADEA claims.
Upon the completion of the administrative process, the case would
be ripe for arbitration. Two routes are possible at this point. Where both
parties are willing to submit to arbitration, that proceeding would com-
mence without resort to the courts except for a later petition to confirm
or review the arbitration award under sections 9 and 10 of the FAA. In
addition, the reviewing court should satisfy itself that the arbitrator ap-
plied the substantive provisions of the federal statute consistent with the
limited-review standard recognized in Mitsubishi and McMahon. Alter-
natively, where the claimant is unwilling to submit to arbitration-out of
Credit Union, 491 U.S. 164 (1989). For an early effort by this author at an alternative approach, see
Note, Federal Power to Regulate Private Discrimination: The Revival of the Enforcement Clauses of
the Reconstruction Era Amendments, 74 COLUM. L. REv. 449 (1974).
114. Cf EEOC v. Cosmair, Inc., L'Oreal Hair Car Div., 821 F.2d 1085 (5th Cir. 1987) (postdis-
pute settlement agreements may compromise substantive rights under ADEA but, as a matter of
public policy, cannot foreclose right to file charge with the EEOC or otherwise cooperate with
EEOC investigation). The holding of Cosmair is codified in the Older Worker Benefits Protection
Act: "No waiver agreement may affect the Commission's rights and reponsibilities to enforce this
Act. No waiver may be used to justify interfering with the protected right of an employee to file a
charge or participate in an investigation or proceeding conducted by the Commission." Pub. L. No.
101-433, § 201, 104 Stat. at 984 (amending 29 U.S.C. § 626(0(41)).
115. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f)(l) (1988).
116. 29 U.S.C. § 626(d) (1990).
117. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f)(l)(1988); 29 U.S.C. § 626(c)(1) (1988). Admittedly, EEOC en-
forcement resources are limited. Arbitration of ADEA claims does not, however, exacerbate and
may well lighten the agency's caseload difficulties.
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fear that statutory claims will be held time-barred either under the 90-
day period for filing a Title VII action from date of receipt of the EEOC's
right-to-sue letter"18 or the two-year statute of limitations for filing an
ADEA action" 9-the claimant should be permitted to file a civil ac-
tion.120 Where there is a valid arbitration agreement under the FAA,
however, the court should stay the action under section 3 and refer the
dispute to arbitration, while retaining jurisdiction to confirm or review
the award.
The arbitration need not mirror what would transpire in a civil ac-
tion. The benefits of arbitration would be lost if all of the procedures
entailed in a civil action were simply transported to the arbitral arena.
However, the premise of the Court's rulings in McMahon and Rodriguez
is that arbitration entails only a waiver of a procedural right to a judicial
forum rather than a waiver of any substantive right accorded by the stat-
ute. Consistent with that premise, the arbitrator is obligated to decide
the dispute in conformity with the substantive standards of the statute
and should have the authority to award whatever injunctive or monetary
relief is necessary to remedy a proven statutory violation.12' The court
should review the award for conformity with applicable legal standards
and to ensure that findings of fact are not clearly erroneous. Moreover,
in order to permit meaningful review by the court, a transcript of the
hearings should be kept and the award should be accompanied by an
opinion containing findings of fact and reasons for the manner of disposi-
tion of the statutory claim.
4. Revisiting the Section 1 Issue
The choice before the Supreme Court in Gilmer is whether to apply
section 1 literally to exclude all employment contracts evidencing a
transaction in commerce from the reach of the FAA, or to take up the
challenge of refashioning its pro-arbitration stance so as to better accom-
modate the policies of state and federal protective labor legislation. 122
118. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-S(f)(1) (1988).
119. 29 U.S.C. § 626(e)(1) (1988) (incorporating limitations periods of the 1947 Portal to Portal
Act amendments to the FLSA, 29 U.S.C. § 255 (1988), including three-year period for "willful"
violations, see McLaughlin v. Richland Shoe Co., 486 U.S. 128, 132 (1988)).
120. In order to avoid such protective filings, the party compelling arbitration-typically, the
employer--should be held to have waived any defense of statute of limitations (other than the ad-
ministrative charge-filing requirements).
121. This should include the fee-shifting provisions, if any, of the external law.
122. The approach outlined in the text is consistent in spirit with the recommendation in the
FEDERAL COURTS STUDY COMMITrEE, REPORT OF THE FEDERAL COURTS STUDY COMMITrEE
60-61 (April 2, 1990) that Congress authorize, on a five-year experimental basis, voluntary arbitra-
tion of employment discrimination disputes, with enforcement of awards pursuant to the FAA; and
CHICAGO-KENT LAW REVIEW
III. ARBITRATION IN NONUNION SETTINGS UNDER FUTURE LAW
What role should nonunion arbitration play in a future world where
nonunion employees are protected by law against termination without
"just cause"? I will assume that such legislation has been enacted with-
out considering the justifications for such laws. 123 The question consid-
ered here is whether such measures should rely on arbitration as the
adjudicative mechanism for resolving disputes and developing the sub-
stantive law of the employment relationship. 124
A. Justifications for Reliance on Mandatory Arbitration
Many proposals for wrongful-termination legislation seize upon pri-
vate arbitrators as the adjudicative mechanism of choice. 125 Montana,
the only state thus far to adopt such legislation, imposes a cost-shifting
mechanism to encourage resort to private arbitration. 126 The draft pro-
posal of a Uniform Employment-Termination Act, presently pending
before the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State
Laws, urges reliance on arbitration rather than the civil courts or admin-
istrative agencies. 127 Because mandatory arbitration of "rights" disputes
with the directive of Congress in § 12212 of the newly-enacted Americans with Disabilities Act of
1990 (ADA), 42 U.S.C. § 12101 (1990) ("Where appropriate and to the extent authorized by law,
the use of alternative means of dispute resolution, including... arbitration, is encouraged to resolve
disputes arising under this Chapter."). It is not clear, however, whether the reference to arbitration
here is confined to postdispute agreements.
123. The academic commentary weighs heavily in favor of wrongful-termination legislation.
Particularly influential pieces in this tradition have been Blades, Employment at Will vs Individual
Freedom: On Limiting the Abusive Exercise of Employer Power, 67 COLUM. L. REV. 1404 (1967);
Summers, Individual Protection Against Unjust Dismissa" Time for a Statute, 62 VA. L. REV. 481
(1976). For contrary views, see Freed & Polsby, supra note 14; Epstein, In Defense of the Contract at
Will, 51 U. CHI. L. REv. 947 (1984); Harrison, The "New" Terminable-at- Will Employment Con-
tract An Interest and Cost Incidence Analysis, 69 IOWA L. REv. 327 (1984).
124. I consider here some, but not all, constitutional objections to mandatory arbitration. See
generally Bruff, Public Programs, Private Deciders: The Constitutionality of Arbitration in Federal
Programs, 67 TEx. L. REV. 441 (1989).
125. For representative proposals, see Summers, supra note 123, at 519-32; St. Antoine, A Seed
Germinates: Unjust Discharge Reform Heads Toward Full Flower, 67 NEB. L. REV. 56, 77-78 (1988).
126. The statute apparently contemplates postdispute offers to arbitrate which, if not accepted
by the other party and that party does not prevail in the civil action, exposes the non-accepting party
to an obligation to pay the offering party's post-offer attorney's fees. A discharged employee who
makes an offer to arbitrate that is accepted and who prevails in such arbitration is entitled to have
the arbitrator's fees and the costs of the arbitration borne by the employer. See Wrongful Discharge
from Employment Act of 1987, MONT. CODE ANN. § 39-2-914. The combined effect of the two
provisions is to create powerful-in the case of most discharged employees, irresistible-incentives
to agree to submit disputes under the Montana law to arbitration. But even though Montana has
enacted what as a practical matter is a mandatory arbitration procedure, the award itself is subject to
review in conformity with the limited judicial review accorded awards rendered under consensual
arbitration in the Uniform Arbitration Act. See id.
127. For the current draft of this proposal, see Draft Uniform Employment-Termination Act
Oct. 22, 1990, Daily Lab. Rep. No. 210, at E-l, (Oct. 30, 1990). Although an arbitration system is
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in the employment setting is both an unusual concept 28 and marks a
departure from its roots as a consensual dispute-resolution mechanism,
those who urge use of private arbitrators carry a fairly hefty burden of
justification.
Proponents of wrongful-termination legislation share a common in-
tuition that such laws will spur a vast surge of litigation that may over-
whelm the civil courts. 129 This is likely to be the case even if statutory
protection is limited to terminations and "constructive dismissal" claims
rather than including all adverse personnel decisions affecting employees.
Even so, this anticipated increase in cases argues only for some adjudica-
tive mechanism outside the civil courts. The Western European coun-
tries that have enacted such laws use labor courts or industrial tribunals
that function as special tribunals within the civil court system.1 30 Be-
cause such courts typically involve a tripartite structure of representa-
tives of industry associations, organized labor and the public, this option
is presumably unavailable on an American terrain characterized by de-
centralized collective bargaining and low union density. This option
recommended, the drafting committee also offers alternative procedures for states preferring to util-
ize the civil courts or administrative agencies.
128. At present, only one jurisdiction employs private arbitrators as the adjudicative mechanism
for wrongful-termination legislation. In 1978, the Canadian Labour Code was amended to protect
against unjust dismissal employees who have been with the same employer for at least twelve months
and are not subject to a collective-bargaining agreement. R.S.C. ch. L-2, §§ 240-46 (1985). See also
Act of April 23, 1978, ch. 27, 1977-78 Can. Stat. 607. This measure applies only to industries within
Canada's federal sector-largely, the transportation, comunications and atomic energy fields-com-
prising a thin layer of about 10% of the nonagricultural workforce (which, in turn, is no more than
1/10th of our own labor force). See Estreicher, Unjust Dismissal Laws: Some Cautionary Notes, 33
AM. JUR. CoMP. L. 310, 311-12 (1985); Carter, Collective-Bargaining Legislation in Canada, in
UNION-MANAGEMENT RELATIONS IN CANADA 31 (J. Anderson & M. Gunderson eds. 1982). An
empirical study of experience with nonunion arbitration in the Canadian federal sector has been
undertaken by Genevieve Eden of the University of Toronto. See Eden, Unjust Dismissal: Just Cause
and Remedies Under the Canada Labour Code, PROC. ANN. CONF. CANADIAN INDUS. REL. A.
(1990) (copy available on request from this author); G. EDEN, UNJuST DISMISSAL IN THE CANA-
DIAN FEDERAL JURISDICTION (1990) (Ph.D. Dissertation, University of Toronto, Centre for Indus-
trial Relations).
129. I am not aware of any systematic attempt to quantify the extent of new litigation that would
be generated by such laws. The Federal Courts Study Committee reports that 7500 employment
discrimination cases were filed in the federal courts in 1989. FEDERAL COURTS STUDY COMMIrTEE,
supra note 122, at 61. This figure does not, of course, include state-court filings, and it cannot be
assumed that wrongful-termination filings nationwide will be limited to this order of magnitude.
Extrapolating from the experience of employees under collective bargaining agreements, Jack Stieber
offers the estimate of approximately 2 million employees discharged each year, of which 150,000
"would have been discharged without just cause and reinstated to their former jobs if they had had
the right to appeal to an impartial arbitrator as do almost all unionized workers." See Stieber,
Recent Developments in Employment-at-Will, 36 LAB. L.J. 557, 558 (1985); Stieber & Murray, Pro-
tection Against Unjust Discharge: The Need for a Federal Statute, 16 U. MICH. J.L. REF. 319, 324
(1983).
130. For a good recent survey, see Hepple, Labour Courts. Some Comparative Perspectives, 40
CURRENT LEGAL PROBS. 169 (1988).
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would, moreover, be inappropriate for employees in the nonunion sec-
tor.1 31 Administrative agencies, however, provide an obvious alternative
that could be implemented in this country. 132 The argument, then, has
to be that private arbitration enjoys a comparative advantage over ad-
ministrative agencies.
The usual argument advanced in favor of arbitration over the alter-
natives is grounded in a claim of expertise. This claim has two parts.
The first is that arbitrators have available to them the accumulated wis-
dom of over a half century of grievance arbitration under collective bar-
gaining. As former Dean St. Antoine observes: "Adopting the
arbitration format would immediately make available the vast body of
arbitral precedent concerning substance and procedure that has been de-
veloped in countless decisions over the years."' 33 Even if we grant the
need for expertise, this part of the claim is particularly problematic. The
principles that have developed in labor arbitration were forged, as Profes-
sor Getman reminds us, in consensual settings as part of an ongoing pro-
cess of collective bargaining. Moreover, these principles have been
applied in disputes typically not involving employees whose jobs involve
considerable unsupervised time and the daily exercise of discretion and
judgment. Dismissals for poor performance-as opposed to miscon-
duct-in such unstructured settings are rarely encountered, let alone sus-
tained, by labor arbitrators. 34 An insistence on a formal system of
progressive discipline as a precondition to a sustainable discharge, for
example, may be inappropriate for managerial and supervisory employ-
ees who are likely claimants under a wrongful-termination statute. In a
unionized environment, moreover, an arbitration award that significantly
hampers managerial discretion can be modified in collective bargaining; a
131. There is, it should be noted, increasing disquiet in Europe with the pro-management tilt and
creeping legalism of the labour courts. See L. DICKENS, M. JONES, B. WEEKES & M. HART, DIs-
MISSED: A STUDY OF UNFAIR DISMISSAL AND THE INDUSTRIAL TRIBUNAL SYSTEM (1985) (see
especially chapter 9 advocating greater reliance on arbitration); Hepple, supra note 130; Voize-
Valayre, The French Law of Unjust Dismissals, 23 N.Y.U.J. INT'L L. & POL. 519 (1991).
132. For proposals advocating reliance on administrative agencies, see Bellace, A Right of Fair
Dismissal: Enforcing a Statutory Guarantee, 16 U. MICH. J.L. REF. 207 (1983) (expanded jurisdic-
tion of unemployment-compensation boards); Remarks of Edward B. Miller on the NLRB-Relevant
to the Future, Daily Lab. Rep. No. 188, at D-l (Sept. 29, 1989Xexpanded jurisdiction of the NLRB);
Howlett, Due Process for Nonunionized Employee"7 A Practical Proposal, 32 PRoc. ANN. MEETING
INDUS. REL. RES. A. 164, 167 (1980) (expanded jurisdiction of state labor departments).
133. St. Antoine, supra note 125, at 77; accord, Summers, supra note 123, at 519-32. Dean St.
Antoine, who is the reporter for the drafting committee proposing a Uniform Employment Termina-
tion Act, see supra text accompanying note 127, does not explicitly refer to the desirability of utiliz-
ing labor-arbitration precedents in the commentary accompanying the current proposal.
134. Some of the issues are sketched in Estreicher, Absenteeism and Incompetence: The Role of
the Courts, 35 PROC. N.Y.U. ANN. CONF. LAB. 335, 346-49 (1983).
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similar escape valve would not be available in a statutory "just cause"
regime administered by private arbitrators.
The second part of the claim-the availability of expert deci-
sionmakers-is less assailable. Arbitration, former Dean St. Antoine tells
us:
would permit the use of an established nucleus of experienced arbitra-
tors, and a growing number of young, able aspirants who are caught in
the vicious cycle of being denied experience because they have no expe-
rience. It would facilitate maximum flexibility, at least until more is
learned about future caseloads, because there would be no need to en-
gage a large permanent staff at the outset. 135
As an occasional arbitrator, I welcome an infusion of new employment
opportunities for those in the profession. It remains to be demonstrated,
however, how much specialized expertise is needed for employment dis-
putes; 136 how well the labor-arbitration experience converts to the some-
what different context of statutory claims; and why administrative
agencies could not quickly develop the requisite experience. I doubt,
moreover, that engaging a large body of arbiters can be avoided long
after the onset of a wrongful-dismissal law-particularly since it is the
anticipated caseload that is driving the arbitration proposal in the first
place.
B. Comparative Disadvantages
There are also reasons to believe that there are comparative disad-
vantages to private arbitration over administrative agencies. First, pri-
vate arbitrators sitting as adjudicators under a wrongful-termination
statute act as agents of the state. There are difficulties, both of constitu-
tional and policy dimensions, with having arbitrators paid and selected
by the parties functioning as public adjudicators. 137
Second, once this is conceded, private arbitrators (who typically re-
ceive a per diem fee of upwards of $400) may provide a considerably less
135. St. Antoine, supra note 125, at 77.
136. The American Arbitration Association, it should be noted, uses its commercial panel rather
than its labor panel for assigning arbitrators for disputes under individual employment agreements
(except perhaps for individual contract disputes that are arbitrated under the umbrella of a collective
bargaining agreement, as in the entertainment industry). Dean St. Antoine concedes that "just cause
rulings do not call for the minute technical expertise that may be essential in a permanent hearing
officer specializing in unemployment compensation or Social Security claims." Id. at 78.
137. The current draft of the Uniform Employment-Termination Act, in recognition of such
difficulties, provides for selection and compensation of arbitrators by the state: "As a public right,
the right to protection against discharge without just cause should be administered by a public
agency .... [T]o maintain the public character of the proceedings under the statute, the formal
appointment of arbitrators should be the responsibility of the public agency." Draft Uniform Em-
ployment-Termination Act of October 22, 1990, supra note 127, at E-4 (comment: § 6(a)).
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cost-effective means of dispensing industrial justice than an administra-
tive agency.
Third, unlike administrative agencies, private arbitrators do not
screen cases for probable merit and are not well-situated to mete out
summary dispositions in appropriate cases. Unless the substantive judg-
ment is made that every termination decision requires a hearing on the
merits, some mechanism for weeding out plainly nonmeritorious cases
and attempting to mediate solutions will be needed to keep costs down to
a manageable level and avoid a situation where the sheer queue of cases
prevents a prompt decision-thought to be critical to successful imple-
mentation of a reinstatement remedy.1 38 Since neither of the parties is
bearing the cost of the proceeding itself, other than attorney's fees, they
are not likely to face the right incentives. A filing-fee requirement is an
unpromising means of promoting self-screening, unless set at a more than
nominal level that may lead to under-enforcement of statutory norms. A
provision shifting attorney's fees to prevailing parties also would deter
potentially meritorious claims and is unlikely to secure political accept-
ance from representatives of claimants' interests. In all likelihood, the
appointing agency will be called upon to make the "reasonable cause"
screening decision. 1 3 9 But this method sacrifices significant efficiencies-
and lowers the potential for mediated solutions by separating that screen-
ing task from the ultimate decisional responsibility.
Fourth, private arbitrators who sit to dispense public justice will be
subject to the due process requirements that govern any form of public
adjudication. In the American legal culture, this will, of necessity, result
in increasing levels of formality that reduce whatever advantages of speed
and informality arbitration traditionally has enjoyed. It is doubtful that
a doctrine of stare decisis can be successfully resisted, simply to ensure
that statutory norms are being applied-here, as an exercise of direct
governmental authority rather than through the filter of a private con-
tract-in a relatively evenhanded and doctrinally coherent manner.
Finally, the tradition of limited judicial review of arbitration awards
is not likely to take root in this context. It is difficult to understand how
arbitrators functioning de facto as an administrative agency under a stat-
ute can be immunized from the standards of judicial review applicable to
administrative-agency adjudication. 140 A formal exception can be carved
138. See supra note 32.
139. See St. Antoine, supra note 125, at 78. The current Draft of the Uniform Employment
Termination Act, supra note 127, does not provide a screening mechanism.
140. The Draft Uniform Employment-Termination Act sets forth the grounds for vacating
award that are available under the FAA, and adds an additional ground: "the arbitrator committed
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out of federal and state administrative procedure acts. However, princi-
ples of judicial review inspired, if not required, by constitutional due pro-
cess and delegation-doctrine concerns will quickly rise to the fore.
In short, arbitration here is not likely to present any real advantage
over an administrative agency, and seems a circuitous route to establish-
ing what will ultimately look and operate like an administrative-agency
structure.
IV. CONCLUSION
Arbitration in nonunion settings does not warrant an aggressive
pro-arbitration policy akin to the Steelworkers Trilogy. Nonunion arbi-
tration does have a useful role to play in contexts that permit an essen-
tially contractarian perspective. With respect to the adjudication of
claims governed by external law, however, adjustments are necessary to
ensure that the interests of a third party, the public, are given effect in the
arbitral forum. As a public adjudicative mechanism, mandatory arbitra-
tion is a highly problematic alternative to administrative agencies.
a substantial error of law." See Draft Uniform employment-Termination Act of October 11, 1990,
supra note 127, at E-5 (§ 8). This presumably is intended to be a more lax standard than would be
employed for review of legal error by administrative agencies. No provision appears to be made for
review for errors of fact, whether on a substantial-evidence or rational-basis standard.

